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Television advertising is a billion-dollar industry in the United States.  Currently, advertisers 
place their messages in television programs that are estimated to have a high proportion of 
their target demographic viewers.  The advertising spots are usually purchased months in 
advance at set list prices or at negotiated prices.  Technologies that can place advertisements 
at the cable box level, instead of the program level, will provide advertisers with the ability to 
target any demographic group directly and in real-time.  This thesis explores the new 
decision-making required by this new technology and how the television advertisement space 
can be sold more effectively.  In particular, it compares a list price system to a number of 
new auction models. 
The structure of the auctions for the new targeted television advertising system is 
unique and has not been previously studied in the literature.  This thesis explores new auction 
models that can capture these unique features and lead to desirable results for the seller of the 
advertisement space.  A simplified analytical model shows how these features impact 
advertisers’ bidding behavior and how a list price system compares to the auction models in 
the ability to raise revenue for the seller of the advertising space.  These issues are then 
explored under various market settings with differing numbers of advertisers and value 
distributions that these advertisers have for the advertising space. 
Since sequential first price auctions have undesirable consequences such as strong price 
fluctuations, this work focuses on second price auctions.  The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) 
mechanism is customized for this problem by developing an optimization formulation that 
determines the best set of advertisers for a particular advertisement space.  Because execution 
time may be an issue, other auction models are developed that lead to similar outcomes as the 
VCG mechanism but require less computational effort. 
This thesis provides guidance on when a list price system will lead to higher expected 
revenue than an auction model and vice versa in a targeted television advertising system.  It 
also demonstrates why some of the standard auction models cannot be applied to this 
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1.1. TELEVISION ADVERTISING 
An estimated $153.7 billion was spent on advertising in the U.S. in 2007 and over 40% of 
this amount was spent on television advertising (TNS Media Intelligence, 2007).  Television 
is a very attractive advertising medium because it can use both sight and sound for dynamic 
selling that is very close in nature to personal selling.  Furthermore, it allows the advertiser to 
target both selective and mass markets by placing advertisements in shows that are viewed by 
the desired demographic group.  In addition, television advertising can be cost-efficient by 
selecting the appropriate time of day to broadcast the advertisements (Sissors and Baron, 
2002). 
Advertisers who are planning a television advertising campaign want to know how 
many people will see the ad (defined as reach), how often they will see the ad (defined as 
frequency), and the total number of times that the ad will be seen (defined as gross 
impressions).  The information required to make these estimations is provided by Nielsen 
Media Research (http://www.nielsenmedia.com) who track a sample audience in order to 
estimate broadcast ratings.  Broadcast ratings “represent an estimate of the audience that has 
viewed a program or has tuned in during a specific time period” (Sissors and Baron, 2002).  
More specifically, one rating point is equal to one percent of the audience.  To calculate 
gross rating points (GRP), the broadcast ratings of each time the advertisement was shown 
are added together.  By multiplying the GRPs with the target audience base, gross 
impressions, the actual size of the audiences, can be calculated.  Even though both GRP and 
gross impressions contain duplicate audiences, they are the most commonly used measures 
for purchase and pricing decisions for advertisers. 
1.1.1. The Current Advertising System 
Television advertising space is typically bought in three ways (Katz 1995).  In an up-front 
buy (or long-term buy) advertising space is bought for the entire upcoming broadcast year.  
This offers the advertiser insurance against sellouts, in which all available advertising spots 
are sold, but provides poor cancellation options.  In scatter buys (or short-term buys) 
advertising space is bought for the coming quarter, which results in greater flexibility but 
 
 2
comes with the risks that the best inventory (advertising spots) may already have been sold.  
Finally, opportunistic buys are last-minute purchases of available advertising space which 
usually go for a low price but have a high risk of sellout.  As a result, the advertiser may not 
be able to broadcast his messages in his desired television shows. 
When making purchasing decisions, advertisers typically try to reach their advertising 
target while minimizing the cost per thousand (CPM).  This is the cost to achieve 1,000 gross 
impressions (Sissors and Baron, 2002).  However, other measures also influence the price 
that advertisers are willing to pay.  For example, advertisements (ads) placed in prime time 
(between 8 and 11 p.m.) will result in a larger reach than ads placed at other times because 
each time the ad plays, it is seen by many distinct viewers at once.  More reach is a desirable 
trait and is one of the reasons that prime time advertising is so expensive.  Advertisers must 
take all this information into account when trying to reach the intended audience size of their 
target demographic, with the desired frequency, and for a reasonable cost.  Furthermore, they 
must reach these goals by choosing specific programs (television shows) that will carry their 
advertising. 
The cost of advertising in these programs depends on three factors (Sissors and Baron, 
2002).  The first factor, advertisers’ demand for particular programs, has the biggest effect on 
the final advertising prices.  Secondly, the price is influenced by the buyers’ and sellers’ 
estimates of audience sizes for particular programs.  Lastly, expensive productions (such as 
the “Super Bowl”) are priced at a premium as networks try to recover the cost of 
programming and business overhead.  The final advertising prices are determined through an 
elaborate negotiation process in which buyers and sellers must agree on when and where the 
advertisements will be placed. 
In spite of its many benefits, television advertising has some limitations such as low 
viewer attention during advertisements and clutter resulting from the large number of 
advertisements broadcasted within any given television hour.  One of the largest downsides, 
however, is the lack of targeted advertising possibilities.  An advertiser who is trying to 
reach a particular demographic cannot do this directly but must instead choose programs that 
will likely have a significant proportion of his target demographic.  A brief example will 
more clearly demonstrate this inefficiency. 
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Imagine a particular program, such as “The Amazing Race”, which in this hypothetical 
example is seen by a viewer base consisting of 70% female and 30% male.  An advertiser 
who is targeting exclusively females may choose to purchase some advertising space in this 
particular show and reach the large female audience that he is seeking; however, if the ad is 
targeted at females only, it is “wasted” on the smaller – yet substantial – number of male 
viewers.  A technology that allows advertisers to truly target demographic groups, rather than 
to target programs with merely a high proportion of the target demographic group, would be 
of great value to advertisers.   
1.1.2. Targeted Advertising 
By inserting advertisements into the digital cable box of individual households, rather than 
the general program feed, Invidi Technologies Corporation (http://www.invidi.com) has 
developed the technology to allow targeted television advertising.  Their advanced 
technology is capable of determining the demographic viewer composition of each household 
with great accuracy using previous television viewing patterns.  Their comprehensive privacy 
framework does not allow Invidi to access this information; instead, a computer program will 
automatically, and in real time, indicate appropriate ads for the respective households. 
The implementation of this new targeted television advertising technology raises many 
questions and requires new decision-making.  The focus of this thesis is how to price 
advertisements when this technology is available to advertisers.  The advertisement space 
may be sold by setting individual list prices for each demographic or by implementing an 
auction. 
While this is the first implementation of such a system on television, targeted 
advertising is well established in other fields.  One of the leaders in internet advertising, 
Google, uses search terms entered by the users to determine which ads to place next to the 
search results.  For example, if a user searches for the word “camera” then the advertisements 
placed around the search results will be for camera stores, camera magazines and other 
relevant websites. 
To sell their advertising space, Google has implemented an online auction in which 
advertisers submit bids for the available advertisement space.  These bids are then used in 
combination with the search terms entered by the user to determine which advertisements are 
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shown and how much they are charged (Edelman, Ostrovsky and Schwarz, 2007).  Even 
though there are significant similarities between the established field of targeted internet 
advertising and the new targeted television advertising (as will be examined in more detail 
later), some critical differences exist.  Consequently, a potential auction implementation for 
the new targeted television advertising field requires new auction models.  
1.2. NEW TECHNOLOGY FOR TELEVISION ADVERTISING 
1.2.1. Implementation 
A technology that can target viewers at the cable box level, instead of the program level, 
removes many of the inefficiencies of the current television advertising market.  Using the 
previous example, the female viewers of “The Amazing Race” could see a different ad than 
their male counterparts (at the exact same time) as long as they are watching the show on 
separate digital cable boxes.  Furthermore, viewers of cable TV channels with very low 
ratings, who currently cannot be captured due to the large uncertainty regarding the audience 
size and demographic composition, can now be captured just as easily as viewers of the top 
rated programs.   
There are many aspects of targeted television advertising that are new and unique; 
however, this thesis will focus specifically on the pricing decision: What is the most effective 
way of selling available television advertising space?  The question will be analyzed under 
the framework of a current implementation plan of targeted television advertising by Invidi, 
hereafter referred to as the seller.  Without specifying technical details, the implementation 











Figure 1.1: Timeline of new targeted television advertising system. 
A few times each hour, advertising timeslots become available (defined as avails) for sale to 
advertisers.  Immediately preceding these avails, the seller will receive an information matrix 
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that lists, for a sample of the viewing households (or viewers), all the appropriate ads that are 
currently in the seller’s system.  Even though this is an automated procedure without human 
involvement, this process could be described as the households “voting” for which 
advertisements appeal to them. 
Due to technological constraints, the seller can only make a small number of 
advertisements available to the households simultaneously.  More specifically, the seller 
must construct a flotilla, which is a block of advertising space for the length of the avail with 
as many slots as the number of advertisements that can be shown simultaneously on different 
digital cable boxes.  For example, Figure 1.2 shows a flotilla that lasts over the full length of 
an avail and consists of two slots.   In this case, the top slot was filled with Advertisement X 
and the bottom slot with Advertisement Y.  Once the avail occurs, viewers will see either one 








Figure 1.2: Sample two-slot Flotilla. 
The challenge is to find a mechanism that determines which advertisements receive flotilla 
slots and how much the advertisers should be charged for this advertising space. 
1.2.2. Pricing Decision 
The seller could operate under a pricing system similar to the current one, in which its clients 
can buy impressions based on a predetermined or negotiated price.  In this scenario, there are 
two main challenges: First, what are the optimal prices they should set in order to maximize 
revenue?  Since the new technology is far more accurate than the regular markets in reaching 
the desired demographic group through its advertising decision system, advertisers should be 
willing to pay a premium price for this service; however, the amount of this premium 
remains to be determined. 
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The second challenge lies in the fact that fixed prices imply a promise of service.  Once 
an advertiser has bought a certain number of impressions, the seller must provide these 
impressions.  This obligation can become a problem if, for example, advertisers are trying to 
reach a large number of the same demographic group within a relatively small time window.  
If the number of actual viewers is not high enough to satisfy the advertisers’ demand, the 
seller would have to find some way of compensating advertisers that did not receive their 
desired number of impressions.  To avoid this scenario, the seller could stop selling 
advertising spots targeting this particular demographic group as soon as sales have reached 
the forecasted level of viewers for that demographic.  However, even with this approach the 
impression obligation may not be met if viewer forecasts do not match actual viewer 
numbers. 
As an alternative to a list price system, the seller could run an auction in which 
advertisers specify not only the desired quantity of impressions for a particular demographic 
group but also the price that they are willing to pay.  Their success in achieving the desired 
number of impressions and the actual price they will pay per impression is then determined 
by the auction.  Under this system, the seller is no longer responsible for ensuring that 
advertisers receive their desired number of impressions because the advertisers’ success in 
reaching their impression goal is solely a function of their bids.  In other words, unsatisfied 
bidders must simply raise their bids if they want to reach more viewers.  Of course, this 
statement only remains true as long as the advertiser does not demand an audience size that is 
larger than the complete television advertising market that is under the seller’s control.  
Another advantage of an auction based system is the fact that it is more efficient in 
allocating impressions to the advertisers that value them the most (see literature review 
below).  Auctions are not without drawbacks, however.  Advertisers that are used to the 
traditional system may be uncomfortable with this new way of purchasing impressions.  An 
auction burdens the advertisers with the additional challenge of determining an appropriate 
bid and it creates uncertainty with regards to the number of viewers that will be reached.  
Given that advertisers may have a fixed target number of impressions they need to reach, 
some may not be willing to participate in an auction. 
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1.3. CONTRIBUTION OF THIS THESIS 
In this thesis, new auction models are presented which can handle the complexity of a new 
targeted television advertising system.  The new technology contains some unique features 
which have not been previously studied in the literature.  Through a simplified analytical 
model, insights are gained into the implications of these features on bidding behavior and 
revenue generation using the standard auction models.  Furthermore, new auction models are 
presented and analyzed with respect to their effectiveness in raising revenue for the seller.  
Within the context of the discussed implementation of the new technology, this thesis 
answers the following questions: 
• How does the market structure (in terms of number of advertisers and their values 
for ads) influence the optimal list prices that the seller should set for their 
impressions? 
• What should the rules of an auction model be if it were to be put in place instead of 
a list price system? 
• How does the revenue generated by the proposed auction models compare to the list 
price system and how does the comparison depend on the market structure? 
Following this introductory section, Chapter 2 presents a literature review of general auction 
theory, specific implementation issues, and relevant real world applications of auctions.  The 
simplified analytical model of Chapter 3 shows the effect of the unique features of the new 
technology on the standard auction models and compares the resulting revenue to that of a 
list price system.  Chapter 4 relaxes the assumptions and uses Monte Carlo simulation to 




2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. AUCTION THEORY 
2.1.1. Overview 
Auctions have been used to transfer goods from sellers to buyers since as early as 500 B.C. 
when they were used in Babylon (Krishna, 2000).  Surprisingly, it took until the 1960s until 
auctions were first studied in the research literature.  It was William Vickrey with his paper 
on “Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders” in 1961 who started 
what is now a very active field of research.  In fact, the topic has become so broad that it is 
investigated by researchers in many different disciplines, including economics, operations 
research / management science, sociology, and computer science (Rothkopf and Park, 2001).  
According to Rothkopf and Park, each discipline has had its own focus, with economics 
using simplifying assumptions to solve game theoretic models mathematically, operations 
research paying closer attention to details by loosening the constraint on strict optimality, 
sociology investigating the effect of repeated auctions on participant behaviour, and 
computer science designing automated auction agents and using auction concepts in general 
application designs.  This thesis will review work from all of these fields with an emphasis 
on papers from the operations research discipline. 
2.1.2. Single-item Auctions 
There are four distinct auction forms that are commonly used to sell a single-item.  Each of 
these auction types are identified by Vickrey (1961) and can be found in real-life 
applications. 
English Auction – The English auction is frequently used in the sale of artwork and other 
collectibles, and is the type of auction commonly featured in Hollywood movies.  During 
such an auction, bids are freely made or called out by the auctioneer (which also gives it the 
name “open ascending price auction”) until no bidder is willing to increase the last 
announced bid.  At this point, the item is sold to the last (and highest) bidder for the amount 
of his bid.  The format of this auction promotes truth-telling; i.e., bidders will reveal their 
true valuation of the item (Vickrey, 1961). 
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A simple example will illustrate the concept of truth-telling: imagine a bidder A, who 
values an item at $100, and who has just observed bidder B announce a bid of $90; clearly, 
bidder A should continue bidding with an amount above $90 (but below $100) because he 
will else forgo the possibility of securing the item for a price that is below his value.  
However, if bidder B announces a bid of $100 or higher, bidder A should no longer 
participate in the auction because he would have to pay an amount that is beyond his value of 
the item.  In effect, all bidders announce increasing bids up to their personal value and the 
bidder with the highest value receives the item for the last price given by the bidder with the 
second highest value (which will be equal to that second highest value). 
Dutch Auction – Another, perhaps less well known, auction form is the Dutch auction.  It is 
used extensively in the sale of flowers in the Netherlands (McAfee and McMillan, 1987).  
The auctioneer begins with a very high price and then continuously decreases this price until 
the first bidder accepts, receiving the item for the last announced price.  From a bidding 
strategy perspective, this auction is far more challenging than the English auction.  Truth-
telling is not the optimal strategy because any bidder who accepts the auctioneer's price as 
soon as it reaches the bidder’s value will always make a profit of zero (where profit is his 
value for the item minus the price paid).  In comparison, bidders who allow the price to 
decrease to an amount below their value for the item create profit opportunities for 
themselves.  The lower they let the price fall before they bid, the higher their potential profit; 
however, the further they allow the price to fall, the higher the probability that another bidder 
will capture the item before them.  Balancing this trade-off, bidders will engage in bid 
shading, which means that they only accept prices that are below their respective values.  
The degree of bid shading depends on a number of factors and will be explored more closely 
in a later section. 
Sealed Bid First Price Auction – In a sealed bid first price auction, bidders cannot observe 
each other's bids and can only submit one bid.  The auctioneer observes all bids and sells the 
item to the highest bidder for the amount of his bid.  This auction form is often used when 
large contracts are tendered, and most people will engage in this type of auction when 
purchasing a new home.  Bidders face the same challenges as in the Dutch auction because 




Sealed Bid Second Price Auction – This auction form is identical to the sealed bid first 
price auction except that the winner must only pay the second highest bid.  This slight change 
induces truth-telling behaviour: the price that the winning bidder will pay for the item is 
independent of his own bid; instead, the price is the second highest bid.  His own bid will 
only affect his probability of winning the item. 
A small example demonstrates this clearly: bidder A values the item at $100 and only 
bids $90 while bidder B bids $95, leaving bidder A without the item and a profit of zero.  
Had bidder A bid his true value, he would have received the item for $95, making a profit of 
$5.  Had bidder B only offered $80, bidder A would have made a profit of $20 regardless of 
whether he had bid $100 or $90.  Clearly, bidding $100 – or his true value – is the superior 
choice. 
While these are the four most commonly used auctions, this is certainly not an 
exclusive list of single-item auctions.  Extensions are the inclusion of entry fees and 
reservation prices, which are set by the seller.  An entry fee must be paid by all bidders 
regardless of whether they are successful in the auction and a reservation price is a minimum 
amount that the winning bidder has to pay.  Further examples of alternative auctions include 
the all-pay auction, in which each bidder must pay his bid regardless of whether he wins the 
object or not.  In the third-price auction, the winning bidder must only pay the third highest 
bid.  Riley and Samuelson (1981) describe an even more eccentric two player auction, which 
they termed sad loser auction: both bidders pay an entry fee, the higher bidder receives the 
item for free, but the losing bidder must pay his bid.  They show that even this auction model 
has an equilibrium bidding strategy.  Many of these unusual auctions are only theoretical 
constructs and are rarely used in practice. 
2.1.3. Multi-item Auctions 
While single-item auctions have been studied extensively and are well understood, most of 
today's auction literature focuses on multi-item auctions.  Multi-item auctions are 
significantly more complex than single-item auctions and fall into different categories.  In the 
simplest setting, identical items are sold to bidders that each only desire one item.  The 
auction becomes more complicated if bidders want to acquire more than one of these 
identical items, and matters are significantly complicated if these bidders experience 
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increasing or decreasing utility for particular packages of items or if the items are no longer 
identical. 
The auction models that are available to the seller are endless: he may choose to sell the 
items one by one in sequential auctions or simultaneously in one auction; furthermore, there 
are a vast number of possible auction rules that he may employ to sell his items.  Following 
is a list of some of these auction models to give the reader a flavour of the variety. 
Identical Items – In a setting with bidders desiring multiple items from a total of N identical 
items, Krishna (2002) describes the following sealed bid auction models: in a discriminatory 
auction, the top N bids win an item and must pay the amount of their bid; bidders that submit 
multiple bids of different amounts will end up paying these differing amounts for each of the 
items.  In a uniform price auction, all N items are sold at the price at which the total amount 
demanded equals the total amount supplied.  And finally in a Vickrey auction, bidders must 
pay the amount required to secure that particular item; i.e., for the first item the bidder must 
pay the Nth highest competing bid, for his 2nd item he must pay the N-1th highest bid, etc.  
Krishna also lists the corresponding open auction models: in the multiunit Dutch 
auction, bidders buy items one by one – as the auctioneer keeps lowering the price – until all 
items are sold (the outcome is equivalent to the discriminatory auction).  In a multiunit 
English auction, bidders indicate the number of items they are willing to purchase at the 
current price.  The auctioneer keeps increasing the price until the number of demanded items 
equals the supply of items (the outcome is equivalent to the uniform price auction).  Lastly in 
the Ausubel auction, the auctioneer keeps increasing the price and the bidders purchase items 
at the price at which the residual supply (items that no other bidders are willing to buy at the 
current price) becomes available (outcome equivalent to the Vickrey auction). 
Non-identical items – In an auction with non-identical items, bidders must be able to specify 
the price that they are willing to pay for certain groups, or packages, of items.  As bidders 
make offers for overlapping packages, a second problem besides determining the price that 
each bidder should pay emerges.  Which bidders have won which items?  This is known as 
the winner determination problem.  For example, if bidder A bids $6 for item X and bidder B 
makes individual $5 bids for item X and Y, as well as a combined bid of $12 for both items, 
item X may go to bidder B even if bidder A values the item more individually.  However, if 
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another bidder places a bid on item Y that exceeds $6, then bidder A will receive item X.  
This is the realm of combinatorial auctions. 
The paper by Rassenti et al (1982) was one of the first papers on the topic of 
combinatorial auctions.  It was set in the context of developing a mechanism to allocate 
arrival and departure airport time slots.  In a more recent paper, Pekec and Rothkopf (2003) 
list the current strategies that are used to cope with the mathematically hard winner 
determination problem: the algorithmic approach uses either integer programming 
techniques, which work particularly well for smaller problems and guarantee optimality, or 
approximation algorithms, which can handle larger problems and are usually close to 
optimality.  Another solution is to relegate computational complexity by forcing bidders to 
indicate other complementary bids that make their offer part of the optimal set.  This does not 
remove the complexity of the winner determination problem but merely transfers it to the 
bidder.  Therefore, bidders with superior computational technology available to them are 
favoured by this method.  A clever solution to maintaining fairness in the face of 
computational limits is to provide bidders with an opportunity to provide a different set of 
winners if their suggested set results in higher revenue for the seller.  In the context of 
auctions, fairness is achieved when all bidders are treated equally by the seller and when sub-
optimal solutions, which favour some bidders, are rejected.  Alternatively, complexity 
reduction can be achieved by limiting biddable combinations which makes the algorithmic 
approach feasible for larger problem sets.   
In addition to the solution to the winner determination problem, rules regarding the 
payment structure must be put in place.  Such rules could specify a first price system, in 
which each bidder must pay his bid if he wins his desired item(s).  As an alternative solution, 
Clarke (1971) and Groves (1973) generalized the Vickrey auction to a more general solution 
named the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism.  The mechanism is famous for its 
dominant truth-telling strategy and perfect efficiency – even in combinatorial auctions 
(Rothkopf, 2007).  Efficiency is achieved when the total value of the winners is maximized 
(i.e. when the bidders who value the items the most receive the items).  The VCG mechanism 
achieves these properties by optimizing the revenue to the seller based on the existing bids 
but reimbursing each successful bidder by the amount of additional revenue that the 
particular bidder has added to the system (i.e., the decrease in revenue that would result if 
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that bidder had not submitted his bid).  The precise way in which the VCG mechanism 
determines payments of bidders will be demonstrated in Chapter 4. 
A further discussion on combinatorial auction mechanisms is outside of the scope of 
this thesis but Pekec and Rothkopf’s paper provides a good starting point for the interested 
reader.  For a full review, Crampton, Shoham and Steinberg (2006) have published an 
extensive book on combinatorial auctions. 
Given that the auctions for targeted television advertisements will offer multiple flotilla 
slots simultaneously, this system clearly falls into the realm of multi-item auctions for non-
identical objects (different demographic groups are worth different amounts to advertisers).  
Advertisers may bid for particular groups and combination of groups which – superficially – 
gives it the appearance of a typical combinatorial auction.  However, as will be discussed 
later, the unique way in which impressions (the actual desired item) are linked to flotilla slots 
(the means to receive the desired item) gives this system a structure very distinct from 
combinatorial auctions. 
2.1.4. Private versus Common Value Auctions 
Aside from the number of items for sale, another important characteristic of an auction is 
whether the items have private or common values.  Vickrey (1961) worked under the private 
value model, where each bidder has his own independent value for the item.  This 
assumption is usually valid for items such as artwork and collectibles in which individual 
preferences determine the personal value. 
In contrast, some items have a common value to all bidders but there is uncertainty 
regarding the amount of this value.  For example, in an auction for oil extraction rights, the 
value of the oil will be the same for all bidders (world market price); however, the exact size 
of the oilfield is unknown at the time of the auction.  Milgrom and Weber (1982) describe 
how this can lead to the winner's curse: if the value for the item is not only common – but 
also deterministic – then all bidders would place exactly the same bid for the precise value of 
the item.  But since the value is stochastic, the bids will differ according to the individual 
estimates of the value.  The bidder with the highest estimate will place the highest bid and 
win the item; however, the bidder with the highest estimate out of a group of bidders will 
likely have overestimated the value of the item.  As a result, he will overpay.  This is the 
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winner's curse.  Anticipating the winner's curse, savvy bidders will bid below their estimated 
value (shading) by an increasing amount the more uncertain the value of the item.  
Consequently, the seller should provide as much information as possible about the item to 
avoid excessive bid shading. 
In this thesis, the commodity of the seller is advertising space.  Since organizations 
value advertisements differently, as demonstrated by large variations in advertising efforts, 
and cannot resell the impressions for some type of market price, this system will be analyzed 
under a private value assumption.  Therefore, the winner’s curse will not be an issue in the 
choice of auction model for this new targeted television advertising system. 
2.1.5. Revenue Comparison 
The most important feature of any auction model to the seller is their expected revenue.  
However, the most profitable auction model depends on the characteristics of the bidders and 
the auction structure.  McAfee and McMillan (1987) defined the benchmark model by the 
following assumptions: 
1. All bidders are risk neutral. 
2. All bidders have their own private and independent value for the item. 
3. The bidders are symmetric, drawing their values from the same common 
distribution. 
4. Payment is dictated by the bids alone (no other fees). 
Based on these four assumptions, the four standard auctions described in Section 2.1.2 result 
in the same revenue.  This is known as the revenue equivalence theorem.  This may surprise 
the reader since the only difference between the sealed bid first price and the sealed bid 
second price auction is whether the winner pays the highest or second highest bid.  The 
reason that both models will still result in the same revenue is that bidders will bid lower in 
the sealed bid first price auction.  While the benchmark model provides a striking result, its 
assumptions are often violated in real world applications.  Therefore, the effect on revenue 
will be examined as some of the benchmark assumptions are relaxed. 
Krishna (2002) illustrates that if bidders are risk averse, first price auctions will lead to 
higher revenue than second price auctions.  The reasoning is that, while risk aversion does 
not affect bidding behavior in the second price auction, it does influence the first price 
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bidding behavior.  As described earlier, bidders in a first price auction will engage in bid 
shading by balancing their probability of winning (by bidding high) with their expected profit 
(by bidding low).  As their risk aversion grows, their willingness to gamble decreases and 
they would rather make a small profit with a high probability than a large profit with a low 
probability.  Therefore, their bid shading decreases, resulting in higher bids and making first 
price auctions more profitable than second price auctions. 
If the bidders’ values for the item are common, instead of private, the highest revenue 
will be generated by the English auction, followed by the sealed bid second price auction, 
and the lowest revenue will come from the Dutch and the sealed bid first price auction 
(Milgrom and Weber, 1982).  As mentioned before, uncertainty about the value of the item 
increases the fear of the winner's curse in a common value auction.  Information gained from 
the seller before the auction and information gained from other bidders during the auction 
alleviates this fear.  In the English auction, bidders can observe each other's bids and gain 
information regarding how other bidders value the item.  Even though bidders cannot obtain 
the same information in a sealed bid second price auction, they can at least rest assured that, 
even if they grossly overestimated the value, they will only have to pay the second highest 
bid.  In contrast, bidders have neither advantage in the Dutch or the sealed bid first price 
auction and will therefore decrease their bids to a greater extent. 
Relaxing the constraint on bidder symmetry does not lead to a clear preference of one 
auction model; instead, which auction model will generate the highest revenue depends on 
the particular value distributions of the bidders (Krishna, 2002).  With regards to bidder 
payments, Menezes and Monteiro (2005) show that while an entry fee has no positive impact 
on revenue, a reservation price can further increase the expected revenue for the seller.  
Intuitively, setting a reservation price is comparable to a monopolist setting the price above 
the marginal cost. 
Not only is the comparison between auctions interesting but a seller may contemplate 
his expected revenue of an auction compared to a list price system.  Wang (1993) states that 
with certain cost parameters auctions will outperform list price systems.  Going a step 
further, Caldentey and Vulcano (2007) explore the challenges of managing a dual channel 
system.  In their model, buyers can either purchase the item immediately for the list price or 
opt to participate in a terminal auction over time T.  Their results show that the auction is 
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superior only if the seller has a sufficient quantity of items and the discount factor (of the 
value of items over time) is relatively small. 
The immense size of the auction theory literature does not allow for a complete 
discussion of these topics.  The interested reader can find a more complete discussion in the 
excellent literature guide to auctions by Klemperer (1999).   
With regards to the new targeted television advertising system, an interesting question 
is the circumstances under which the revenue equivalence theorem holds or whether one 
auction model theoretically dominates the others in terms of revenue.  Furthermore, as stated 
in Chapter 1, the auction models will be compared to a list price system for the purpose of 
helping the seller decide whether they should use an auction.  Since this thesis involves a real 
world application, we now turn to some practical auction implementation issues. 
2.2. AUCTION IMPLEMENTATIONS ISSUES 
2.2.1. Introduction 
There have been a number of high profile cases in which auctions were used to sell single or 
multiple items.  One such case made it into the Wall Street Journal: in 1994, the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) used a series of auctions to sell radio spectra for 
personal communications services.  The auction was rated as a great success generating $617 
million in revenue for ten licenses (Cramton, 1995).  At the heart of the auction mechanism 
was an ascending bid auction, but a team of economists had worked out detailed rules to 
ensure the success of this high stake venture.  As described by Cramton, strict payment rules 
were put into effect (such as upfront payments), minimum bid increments were specified, 
bidders had to maintain an active bidding history to remain in the auction, and a detailed set 
of rules was put into place to specify when the auction would end.  All these rules were 
aimed at avoiding some of the pitfalls of earlier auction implementations and at creating an 
environment in which a successful auction could be completed. 
Pekec and Rothkopf (2003) summarized the desirable properties of auction 
mechanisms: allocative efficiency is achieved by maximizing the total value to the winners.  
From the seller's perspective, revenue maximization is a very important property of any 
auction mechanism; and, both seller and buyer can benefit from low transaction costs by 
avoiding entry fees and limiting the extent of time and effort necessary to calculate and 
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submit an appropriate bid.  In addition, fairness is required to ensure bidder participation and 
the auction should be failure free, avoiding possible disastrous outcomes of extremely low 
revenue which may result from lack of participation both in terms of the quantity and the size 
of bids.  The following sections will discuss some of the main implementation issues and 
how they play a role in achieving the desirable auction properties suggested by Pekec and 
Rothkopf. 
2.2.2. Avoiding Collusion 
One of the most costly mistakes that a seller can make is to implement an auction mechanism 
that makes it easy for bidders to collude.  Klemperer (2002) lists collusion as the “first major 
set of concerns for practical auction design” (p. 170).  Some auction mechanisms are more 
vulnerable to collusion than others.   
To illustrate this point, imagine a situation with two bidders competing for one item and 
agreeing that bidder A should receive the item for a very low price, x, and compensate bidder 
B with a side payment y.  In a sealed bid second price auction, they can quite easily collude.  
Bidder A can submit a high bid (close to his true value) while bidder B submits a bid equal to 
x, which would win the item for bidder A at price x.  Should bidder B try to cheat bidder A 
by bidding an amount slightly above x, he will not succeed since bidder A submitted a 
relatively large bid; therefore, the collusion will likely be successful.  In contrast, in a sealed 
bid first price auction, the collusion could only be successful if bidder A submits the low bid 
x and bidder B submits an even lower bid; however, bidder B now has a strong incentive to 
bid just above x and win the item for himself at a very low price. 
Klemperer lists some high profile cases in which participants colluded successfully in 
an ascending auction and notes that “a frequently repeated auction market […] is particularly 
vulnerable to collusion” (p. 172).  Since the targeted television advertising system will 
feature frequently repeated auctions, collusion is an issue that needs to be addressed.  Even 
though collusion is a larger problem in an auction of very expensive items (such as radio 
spectra, oil fields, etc.) than in less expensive items (such as viewer impressions), the 
proposed auction should be constructed in a way that does not permit systematic collusion 
between the main advertisers. 
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2.2.3. Information Sharing 
The extent of information sharing that will be present in the auction is another aspect that 
will have an effect on collusive behaviour.  As noted by Gallien and Wein (2005), in a multi-
round auction, full disclosure of previous bids can lead to collusion and strategic behaviour.  
For example, using peculiar numbers as bids can be a method of signaling competitors 
(Klemperer, 2002) and collusive agreements can more easily be enforced by the participants 
if they have access to full information.  However, in a multiunit auction, a complete lack of 
information can lead to inefficiencies in the price formation process as bidders are unsure 
which bids to increase or decrease (Gallien and Wein, 2005). 
Another aspect that needs to be considered with respect to information sharing is how 
potential bidders may feel about the revelation of their bids because this may lead to other 
bidders gaining competitive information.  In an experiment conducted by Millet et al. (2004) 
through an online procurement auction, they found that the revelation of bidding information 
leads to lower acceptance rates (percent of invited suppliers that accept the invitation and log 
into the auction event).  In an even more troubling finding, they note that auctions with high 
information sharing may attract suppliers looking for market intelligence and may prevent 
bidders who are concerned about confidentiality from participating in the auction.  This can 
lead to fewer serious bids and can increase the extent of bid shading – both can depress 
revenues substantially. 
In the new targeted television advertising system, advertisers will expect some type of 
information sharing about their current advertising campaign so that they can increase or 
decrease bids as necessary to achieve their goals.  The proposed system will need to balance 
this information need with the privacy concerns of advertisers. 
2.2.4. Attracting a Sufficient Number of Bidders 
Information sharing is not the only aspect of an auction mechanism that can reduce the 
number of bidders.  Ascending auctions can also lead to fewer bidders because everyone 
expects the bidder with the highest value for the item to win (Klemperer, 2002).  In particular 
with auctions for expensive items – which make the process of developing an appropriate 
bid, in itself, expensive – smaller entities may be discouraged from participating in the 
auction if they feel that the large entities will always have the chance to overbid them in the 
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end.  In comparison, a first price auction allows small entities to bid aggressively in hopes of 
outbidding a large entity that shaded their bid too heavily. 
An interesting finding that came from the experiment by Millet et al. (2004) was that 
acceptance rates decline as more suppliers were invited.  Auction participants are well aware 
that their chance of success declines as the pool of participants increases.  Therefore, the 
seller must choose a fine line between encouraging extensive participation while making 
each potential bidder feel that they have an opportunity to make a profit. 
The seller can accommodate by segmenting the advertising market.  While there may 
be significant competition for nationwide, prime time flotilla slots, which may deter smaller 
advertisers from participating in the auction, other local and off-peak hours flotilla slots will 
attract less fierce competition and will thus be more attractive to smaller advertisers.  In such 
a way, a wide participation of advertisers in the new targeted television advertising system 
can be achieved. 
2.2.5. Perception of Fairness 
Not only must the seller assure the bidders that their participation is worthwhile, but the 
seller must also ensure that the process and the outcome of the auction are perceived as fair.  
In their discussion on the procurement auctions of Mars Inc., Hohner et al. (2003) point out 
that “it is very important that the bidders perceive Mars’ auctions to be fair” (p. 30) to ensure 
that their suppliers do not refuse to participate in the auction.  Fairness can be achieved by 
having explicit – and credible – rules, as well as a transparent process.  For example, for a 
sealed bid second price auction to work, bidders must be assured that the seller will not make 
a fake bid to increase the selling price.  However, as mentioned earlier, information sharing 
has some negative effects and a trade-off between protecting bidder privacy and a transparent 
process must be reached. 
As a new technology in the market place, the seller will have to build a reputation as a 
credible auction broker with clear rules that are enforced equally on all players. 
2.2.6. Training 
Another important aspect of auction implementation is the extent of training offered by the 
seller (Hohner et al., 2003 and Millet et al., 2004).  Information sessions, or even mock 
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auctions, may make potential bidders feel more confident about participating in the auction 
and can therefore lead to a larger pool of bidders. 
Given the extensive number of advertisers that will potentially participate in the seller’s 
auction, information sessions are not a feasible option.  However, clear instructions on how 
the auction system works and how advertisers can best achieve their goals should be easily 
accessible to all potential clients. 
2.2.7. Challenges with Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) Mechanism 
As previously discussed, the VCG mechanism has some very attractive theoretical attributes, 
such as allocative efficiency and enticement of truth-telling, but it has some significant 
implementation issues that need to be discussed.  Rothkopf dedicated a whole article, 
“Thirteen Reasons Why the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Process Is Not Practical” (2007), to 
discuss the serious drawbacks of this method.  He points out that truth-telling bidding 
behaviour results in weak equilibria and that in a case where bidders draw their values from 
different value distributions, bidders who are sure to lose may not participate.  In other 
words, bidders who are convinced that others value the item(s) higher will not participate 
thus leading to lower revenues.  Other concerns are the bid preparation and bid 
communication costs which will occur as bidders try to estimate their value for the item.  In 
the general VCG process for n items, bidders will have to submit 2n – 1 bids (for each 
combination of items) which implies that they need to estimate their value for each of those 
bids.  This large number of bids also makes the winner determination effort more demanding.  
Another practical concern, which is not addressed sufficiently by theoretical work, is the 
effect of budget constraints of the bidders which can destroy truthful bidding.  Even if 
truthful bidding persists, this in itself causes the problem of information revelation.  While 
some auction mechanisms (such as the sealed bid first price auction) do not force bidders to 
reveal their true value, the VCG mechanism certainly does.  This may be unappealing to 
bidders, as discussed above.  Furthermore, the VCG mechanism is susceptible to cheating 
because it is easier for colluding partners to enforce their collusion.  In a sequence of 
auctions the VCG mechanism may also no longer be strategy-proof because the bidders’ 
values in any particular auction will depend on their assessment of the level of competition in 
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the future auctions.  Finally, the process is also revenue deficient because it can result in zero 
revenue for the seller. 
While only some of these issues may be applicable to any particular auction 
implementation, these issues must be carefully considered before proceeding with a potential 
VCG implementation.  To complete this literature review, the following section will provide 
an overview of some real world auction implementations in fields that have similar attributes 
to the targeted television advertising field. 
2.3. RELEVANT APPLICATIONS 
2.3.1. Smart Markets 
The auction format that the seller chooses to sell targeted television advertisements may 
belong to the family of market mechanisms known as smart markets.  Gallien and Wein 
(2005) define smart markets as “exchange institutions supported by a computer executing an 
optimization algorithm to solve the allocation problem associated with each given set of 
bids” (p. 77).  In their paper, a linear program provides competitive information feedback to 
the bidders, who then have the chance to update their bids.  Their updated values create new 
inputs to the linear program which is subsequently re-solved.  Using a game-theoretic 
framework, they develop an upper bound for the winning bids and show some structural and 
convergence properties of the bidders’ myopic best-response dynamics. 
The targeted television advertising system can also be described as a smart market in 
which individual auctions are executed electronically through an algorithmic mechanism.  
However, this new system is quite different from the Gallien and Wein model of a producer-
supplier setting in which suppliers work under production capacities and experience linear 
production costs. 
2.3.2. Internet Advertising Auctions 
Users of Google and Yahoo! search engines know that there is an area at the top and right of 
the screen reserved for advertisements relevant to the search terms they have used.  Some 
users, however, are not aware that these advertisement slots were auctioned off to potential 
advertisers.  In fact, Google’s current auction system has some strong resemblance to a 
potential future auction for the targeted television advertising spots.  Both are targeting 
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viewer impressions and will be comprised of many mini-auctions in which there is no direct 
bidding but where instead a smart market determines the winners and their required 
payments.  The timing and wording of search terms, as well as the timing and viewer 
composition of avails, are so unpredictable and frequent that holding individual (non-
automated) auctions is not possible.  A further similarity is the fact that items (advertisement 
space and flotilla slots) are related to each other in the sense that advertisements located 
higher in the search results will experience more impressions than lower ranked 
advertisements, just as advertisements in the top flotilla slots have an advantage over the ads 
in the bottom flotilla slots. 
The two differences between the systems stem from the way consumers are targeted 
and from technical configurations.  For Google and Yahoo!, consumers are grouped and 
characterized by their search terms.  Yahoo! employs a single measure when selecting 
appropriate advertisements and ranks advertisers by their respective bid amounts.  Google 
goes one step further by factoring in a quality score which indicates how appropriate each 
advertisement is for the given search term (Edelman, Ostrovsky and Schwarz, 2007).  In 
contrast, the targeted television advertising system targets demographic groups and ranks 
potential advertisers by their bids as well as the current size of the respective advertiser 
demographic target group.  Also, under Google and Yahoo!, higher ranked advertisements 
will experience a higher click-rate but will not capture all appropriate viewers exclusively.  
In comparison, the highest ranked advertisement that targets any particular demographic 
group in the new television system will capture that demographic group exclusively.  For 
example, should the top flotilla slot go to an advertiser targeting all males, then all 
advertisers in lower flotilla slots, who are also targeting males or male subgroups, will not be 
able to capture any impressions.  Despite these differences, the similarities between the two 
systems warrant a closer look at the auction format chosen by Google and Yahoo!. 
One of the earliest auction models used to sell Internet advertising was developed by 
Overture (who were acquired by Yahoo! at the end of 2003).  Edelman and Ostrovsky (2007) 
examined Overture’s experiences with this first price auction model and conclude that it was 
not an optimal auction choice.  In particular, they demonstrated that a first price auction, in 
the context of repeated auctions, creates a very unstable system in which bidders act 
strategically and try to game the system.  After any given auction, some bidders may realize 
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that they overpaid (the next highest bid was substantially lower than theirs) and will therefore 
decrease their bid in the next round.  Simultaneously, other bidders may realize that they 
could have won the item by bidding higher and will update their bids accordingly in the next 
round.  The change in bids for the next auction will present further opportunities for 
improvement and an infinite cycle of bidding adjustments occurs.  As a result, bidders will 
invest significant effort into gaming the system despite the fact that no value is created by 
these actions.  The costs of this effort is then passed on to the seller.  Edelman and Ostrovsky 
show empirically that this auction format did indeed lower advertisement revenue for 
Overture. 
Other search engine companies learned from this experience and chose a general 
second price auction to promote truth-telling and discourage strategic bidding.  Google, for 
example, realized that any bidder in position j is only willing to pay the small amount 
necessary to beat bidder in position j + 1.  As a result, the highest bidder will pay the second 
highest bid, the second highest bidder will pay the third highest bid, etc.  However, as 
pointed out by Edelman, Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2007), this is not a VCG mechanism and 
truth-telling is not the dominant strategy in all situations.  Under some scenarios, bidders can 
achieve a higher profit by sacrificing their rank for lower costs by bidding smaller amounts.  
Edelman et al. demonstrate the resulting difficulty in characterizing the bidding equilibrium. 
Google's auction model is increasingly creating academic interest as demonstrated by 
another recent paper by Varian (2007) who compares Google's system to the assignment 
game and calculates the equilibria of the ad auction.  He then uses his method to empirically 
determine the relationship between bids and values.  While the state of internet advertising 
auctions may be described as more progressed than that of television advertising, some work 
has also been done in the latter field. 
2.3.3. The Television Advertising Market 
Due the unique technological capabilities of the new targeted television advertising system, 
no comparable system exists or has been studied by the research community.  However, there 
has been some work regarding the way that television advertisement airtime is currently sold 
in the up-front market.  Jones and Koehler (2002) show how computer-supported online 
auctions could simplify the sale of television airtime.  They propose a combinatorial auction 
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that accepts rule-based bids which does not require the bidder to specify bids for all 
combinations of possible airtime slots.  Their main contribution is a winner determination 
heuristic that is fast enough to be practical in the proposed setting.  Some of their work is 
based on Jones’s dissertation (2000), who also provides an excellent overview of network 
television advertising practices.   
Another paper on the up-front television airtime market was written by Bollapragada et 
al. (2002) and describes how NBC used an optimization-based sales system to be able to 
react quickly to customer requests for advertising placements in order to maximize NBC’s 
revenue.  However, they discuss a list price system – not an auction model. 
2.4. TARGETED TELEVISION ADVERTISING SYSTEM 
The new targeted television advertising system contains a unique environment in which to 
implement an auction.  In the literature, auctions have been well studied but, to the best of 
my knowledge, they have never been studied under the special structure in which bidders are 
bidding for objects (in this case flotilla slots) that will enable them to capture their actual 
desired items (impressions) and in which the objects have different success rates of leading to 
items (ads in higher flotilla slots can receive more impressions).  The academic papers on 
Google’s system perhaps come closest to analyzing this situation but in their system viewers 
will consider any advertisement (with higher ranked ads being more likely to be seen) while 
in the new system only the highest ranked ad that is appropriate to a particular viewer will be 
seen. 
The system is very complex to analyze mathematically so to gain some initial insight 




3. SIMPLIFIED ANALYTICAL MODEL 
3.1. PROBLEM FRAMEWORK 
In this chapter, analytical models are used to compare multiple auction formats to a list price 
system in a framework that is very close to the new targeted television advertising system 
described in Chapter 1.  In particular, there are two items for sale (two flotilla slots) for 
which bids are submitted by n bidders, or advertisers.  The new system recognizes which 
advertisements are appropriate for the individual households.  Since more than one 
advertisement may be appropriate for some households – but only one of them can be 
viewed– attaining a slot in the flotilla may not be sufficient to guarantee impressions from all 
appropriate households; instead, the position within the flotilla will determine which ad 
receives the impression by assigning the impression to the top slot should a household be 
appropriate for both the ad in the top and bottom slot.  This situation will arise commonly as 
advertisers target similar demographics and their ads are therefore either both suitable or both 
unsuitable for a particular household. 
To capture some of this complexity, while maintaining a tractable mathematical model, 
each advertisement is assigned one of two “types”, type A or type B.  One could think of 
these types as, for example, indicating whether an advertisement is targeting females (type 
A) or males (type B).  For this model, it was assumed that advertisers are of type A or B with 
equal probability.  In reality, there are many more types since genders are further broken 
down by age cohorts and possibly income but the restriction to two types is sufficient to 
show the impact of types on the bidding behaviour and revenue generation of auctions. 
Since the advertisement that attains the top slot in the flotilla will always be seen by all 
appropriate households, all advertisers desire this slot regardless of their type.  However, 
advertisers only desire the bottom slot if they are not of the same type as the winner of the 
top slot.  Using the example of types that indicate gender, Figure 3.1 illustrates this point.  
Assume that there are three bidders, Ad X, Y and Z, competing for the flotilla slots.  Ad X 
and Y are both of type A (targeting females) and Ad Z is of type B (targeting males).  
Furthermore, Ad X has placed the largest bid, followed by Ad Y and Ad Z submitted the 
smallest bid.  Since Ad X placed the largest bid, it wins the top flotilla slot as shown in both 
Scenario 1 and 2 of Figure 3.1.  However, Scenario 1 shows why the second largest bidder, 
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Ad Y, is not interested in the 2nd flotilla slot.  Since Ad Y is of the same type as Ad X, it will 
not be able to capture any viewers: no male viewers will be interested in either advertisement 
and all female viewers will find both suitable which by the default rule described above will 
allocate the impression to the top slot.  As a result, the 2nd flotilla slot will instead go to the 
lower bidder, Ad Z, as shown in Scenario 2.  In this type of system, it is also obvious that 
each bidder only desires one flotilla slot since no benefit can be realized by filling both 




Ad X, Type A, 1st Bid
Ad Y, Type A, 2nd Bid
Ad Z, Type B, 3rd Bid Ad X, Type A, 1st Bid
Ad Z, Type B, 3rd Bid
Ad X, Type A, 1st Bid









All Type A 
viewers
No viewers
All Type A 
viewers








Figure 3.1: Flotilla construction example assuming 3 bidders with 2 types. 
We assume that the values that bidders place on a flotilla slot follow a particular value 
distribution known to all bidders, F(.).  Each bidder also knows his own valuation but he does 
not know the valuations of the other bidders, nor would his valuation of the item change if he 
knew.  This is a reasonable assumption because impressions do not have a common value to 
all advertisers (such as oil or gold) but instead corporations have valuations that depend on 
the worth of the impressions to that particular advertiser.  The validity of this assumption can 
be seen in the varying degrees of advertisement engagements by different organizations.  
Hence, this is a perfect private value auction.  Furthermore, we assume that advertisers are 
risk-neutral and are trying to maximize their expected profit. 
The following sections compare two auction models (a first price and a second price 
auction), a list price system, and a second price auction with reservation price and shows the 
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effect of “types” on bidding behaviour and revenue generation, as well as the impact of the 
value distributions. 
3.2. FIRST PRICE AUCTION 
3.2.1. Optimal Bidding Strategy 
As described in Section 2.1.2, the first price auction is defined by the highest bidder winning 
the item and paying the amount that he bid.  A bidder in this type of auction model faces the 
tradeoff between increasing his chance of winning the item by bidding a high value and 
decreasing the amount he needs to pay by bidding a low value.  Using a similar approach to 
Menezes and Monteiro (2005), we analyze this situation from the point of view of one of the 
players, say Advertiser 1.  Let us assume that this advertiser has a valuation v = v1 and 
believes that all other advertisers follow a bidding strategy b(.).  The profit π  that Advertiser 
1 can expect to derive from a particular auction is his valuation of the item v minus his bid b1 
if he secures a flotilla slot, and his profit is zero if he does not secure a slot.  Defining PW(b1) 
as the probability of winning a flotilla slot with a bid b1, we have: 
 ( ) ( )( )111 bvbPb W −=π  (1a) 
Assuming that the bid function b(.) is strictly increasing and differentiable (to be verified 
later) and that the range of b(.) is [0,v] (since the bidder will never bid above his value and 
pay more than he values the item, nor bid less than zero), there exists [ ]vx ,0∈  such that b1 = 
b(x).  Therefore, the problem of Advertiser 1 is equivalent to choosing [ ]vx ,0∈  to maximize 
the expected utility: 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )xbvxbPxbx W −== ππ  (1b) 
In the absence of “types” and with only one object for sale, PW is simply the probability of 
having the highest valuation of all bidders, F(v)n-1.  In the framework of this section, winning 
an item can be achieved by having the highest valuation of all bidders, or by having the 
second highest valuation and not being of the same type of the winner of the top slot (since 
bidders are of either type with equal probability, the probability of being of a different type is 
equal to one half), or by having the third highest valuation and being of a different type than 
the winner of the top slot while the second highest bidder is of the same type as the winner 
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(occurring with a probability of one quarter, this scenario leads to the second highest bidder 
losing interest in the auction and the third highest bidder having the chance to capture the 
second slot), and so forth.  Under this scenario, even the lowest bidder has the chance of 
winning if all other bidders are of the other type.  This occurs with probability 2-(n-1). 
Using order statistics (Ross, 2003), the cumulative distribution function of the ith 
smallest random variable (RV), Xi, of n i.i.d. RVs is: 
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Therefore, we get: 
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nxF                 (2) 
To find the maximum utility that Advertiser 1 can achieve, we take the derivative of equation 
(1b) with respect to x and set it equal to zero: 
 ( ) ( ) (x)b'(x)P(x)Pb(x)vxπ' W'W −−=  (3a) 
As stated by Menezes and Monteiro (2005), the expected profit is maximized at x = v in a 
symmetric equilibrium.  Setting ( ) 0=xπ'  yields: 
 ( ) (v)Pb(v)v(v)b'(v)P 'WW −=  (3b) 
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This can be solved by noticing: 
 
( )
















As v goes to zero, the left-hand side of equation (3c) goes to zero because b(.) is bounded and 
therefore k = 0.  By substituting equation (2) into equation (3c) and solving for the optimal 
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And b*(v) = 0 for v = 0. 
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To check whether b(v) is continuous, we notice that when v > 0, 
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And thus b(v) is continuous everywhere.  In addition, from equation (3a) and (3b) we get: 
 ( ) ( ) (x)Pxvxπ' 'W−=  
If x < v, ( ) 0' >xπ  and if x > v, ( ) 0' <xπ .  Therefore x = v maximizes the expected payoff 
and b* is an equilibrium. 
The optimal bidding function of equation (4) maps any possible bidder value into an 
optimal bid that will maximize that bidder’s expected payoff.  Assuming that all bidders 
follow this optimal bid strategy, we can now calculate the expected revenue of the seller. 
3.2.2. Expected Revenue for Seller 
The seller will receive from each bidder the revenue R equal to the bid multiplied with the 
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To find the expected revenue of the seller from this auction, we multiply the number of 
bidders n with the expected revenue E[R] (expectation of equation (5)) from each bidder: 
































A numerical example of a first price auction will be provided later. 
3.3. SECOND PRICE AUCTION 
3.3.1. Optimal Bidding Strategy 
As described in Section 2.1.2, the second price auction is characterized by the highest bidder 
receiving the item but only paying the second highest bid.  In the framework of this section, 
the highest bidder of each type receives one slot and must pay the next highest bid of the 
same respective type.  Similar to the standard second price auction, this mechanism promotes 
truth-telling, i.e. bidding the precise personal value of the object.   
3.3.2. Expected Revenue for Seller 
To find the expected revenue of the seller, we start by calculating the probability mass 
function (pmf) of the revenue that the seller will receive from the highest bidder, M1.  The 
highest bidder will have to pay the second highest bid, X(n-1), if the second highest bidder 
happens to be of the same type (probability of one half); in contrast, he will only have to pay 
the third highest bid, X(n-2) , if the second highest bidder is of the other type but the third 
highest bidder is of the same type as him (probability of one quarter), and so forth.  We 
define X(0) = 0. 


















Similarly, the second highest bidder will have to pay the third highest bid if the highest 
bidder is of the other type (else the second bidder has no more interest in the auction) and the 
third highest bidder is of the same type (probability of one quarter).  With similar reasoning 
as before, we get: 
















And in general, the kth bidder has the pmf of payment: 
















The total expected revenue of the seller is the sum of the expected payments of all bidders, 
namely: 


























nk XE...XEXERE  
which can be rewritten as: 










nk XEknRE  (7) 
3.4. LIST PRICE – OPTIMIZATION 
3.4.1. Formulation 
As an alternative to an auction model, the seller could specify a list price at which flotilla 
slots are sold to any buyer willing to pay the posted price.  If demand surpasses supply, items 
are typically awarded on a first-come-first-serve basis; however, in the automated system that 
the seller will be running, this rule will not be practical and it is conceivable that, as an 
alternative, an optimization mechanism could pick the two advertisements that will maximize 
the seller’s revenue.  Following is a formulation of such an optimization model, assuming 
that the seller knows the actual valuations of the advertisers Va. 
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Linear Integer Programming Optimization Model – List Price System 
Model parameters: 
Va = value per impression of advertiser a 
Tt,a = 1 if ad a is of type { }BAt ,∈ , else 0 







slot) (flotilla item  theattained has   typeof  ad1
,
ta










t,a ∀≤∑ 1  (each ad can only receive one flotilla slot or none) 
tx
t
at ∀≤∑ 1,  (only one ad of each type can attain a flotilla slot) 
aVxL a
t
at ∀≤∑ ,  (each ad can only receive a slot if its V is higher than L) 
atTx atat ,,, ∀≤  (each ad can only claim a slot in congruence with its type) 
{ } atx at ,1,0, ∀∈  
A close examination of the problem reveals that its complexity does not require an 
optimization model and that a few lines of code, or even visual inspection, will find the 
solution more efficiently.  To solve this problem it is merely required to find any two 
advertisements of different types with a personal valuation of the item above the listed price. 
A more interesting question, therefore, is how to set the optimal list price.  
3.4.2. Setting an Optimal List Price 
To find the optimal list price, we need to find an expression of the seller’s profit as a function 
of the list price charged, L.  The seller will receive the list price at least once if the highest 
 
 34
bidder has a personal valuation of the item above the list price, which has a probability of  
1 - F(L)n.  He will receive the list price a second time if the second bidder is above the list 
price and the top two bidders are not of the same type, with a probability of 











− −− , or if the third bidder is above the list price and the top 











− −− , 
and so forth. The profit of the seller is therefore: 
























LFLLπ  (8) 
By setting the first order derivative of the profit with respect to L to zero and solving for L, 
one could find the optimal list price.  A simple way to find the optimal L is to use Solver in 
Microsoft Excel by maximizing equation (8) subject to L. 
3.5. SECOND PRICE AUCTION WITH RESERVATION PRICE 
3.5.1. Optimal Bidding Strategy 
One way to combine an auction model with a list price system is to implement an auction 
with a reservation price.  In this type of auction, the seller is decreasing the probability of 
receiving a very low payment but is increasing the number of potential bidders who do not 
participate in the auction.  The higher he sets the reservation price, the higher his guaranteed 
payment (if the item sells) but the lower his probability of selling the item. 
The optimal bidding strategy in a second price auction with a reservation price is the 
same as the optimal bidding strategy in a second price auction without a reservation price 
except that bidders with values below the reservation price do not participate in the auction. 
3.5.2. Expected Revenue for Seller 
As before, we find the expected revenue of the seller by calculating the probability mass 
function (pmf) of the revenue (payment) that the seller will receive from the highest bidder, 
M1.  The highest bidder will have to pay the second highest bid, X(n-1), if the second highest 
bidder happens to be of the same type (probability of one half) and has a value above the 
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reservation price; in contrast, he will only have to pay the third highest bid, X(n-2) , if the 
second highest bidder is of the other type but the third highest bidder is of the same type as 
he is (probability of one quarter) and his value is above the reservation price, and so forth.  
He will have to pay the reservation price r if all bidders with values above the reservation 
price are of the other type than him (without the reservation price, he would have had to pay 
zero).  This leads to: 
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which results in: 
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And in general, the kth bidder has the pmf of payment: 
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which can be rewritten as: 
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To give the reader a more concrete example, the next section provides a numerical example 
and compares the introduced auction models and a list price system. 
3.6. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE 
3.6.1. Introduction 
In this numerical example, there are three bidders who each draw their value for a flotilla slot 
from a [λ]-exponential distribution so n = 3, F(x) = 1 - exp(-λ*x), and f(x) = λ*exp(-λ*x).  The 
exponential distribution is one of many distributions that could be used to model impression 
valuations of advertisers.  One could argue that there are many advertisers who have a 
relatively low value per impression; perhaps they are targeting a broad range of customers 
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and are willing to pay only a small amount per impression, or their market research indicates 
that advertising only provides a relatively small value to them.  Conversely, some advertisers 
are willing to pay higher prices if they believe in a higher conversion rate from advertisement 
to purchase.  Some advertisers may even value impressions extremely high if they can reach 
their highly specified target group, such as high income females.  The exponential 
distribution models such a situation well because it encompasses a wide left-hand tail close to 
zero (representing the large amount of advertisers with relatively low values) and an open 
right-hand tail (representing the fact that some advertisers may value their impressions 
extremely high).  To provide a complete analysis, however, a later section will provide 
results given some different value distributions.  The following calculations show the 
expected revenue from a first price auction, a second price auction (with and without a 
reservation price) and a list price system given three bidders with [λ]-exponential 
distributions. 
3.6.2. First Price Auction 
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3.6.3. Second Price Auction 
Since the optimal bidding behaviour is truth-telling, we can easily calculate the expected 
revenue using equation (7) and Appendix A: 
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( )[ ] ( )[ ]
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The expected revenue is equal to the first price auction scenario!  While this is not a 
conclusive proof, it does provide a strong indication that the revenue equivalence theorem 
does indeed hold in this framework and that any auction model will result in the same 
expected revenue.  Revenue equivalence will be examined in more detail in a later section. 
3.6.4. List Price 
By equation (8), the profit as a function of the list price is: 
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Using Excel Solver, the maximum profit is achieved with the list price L set to 1.19 / λ which 
results in a profit of 0.93 / λ.  Evidently, the seller can achieve a higher profit if he sets a list 
price instead of selling the flotilla slots through an auction.  The seller’s expected profit does, 
however, depend on him setting the correct list price.  Assuming a [1]-exponential value 
distribution of the three bidders, Figure 3.2 shows the expected revenue as a function of L.  
The graph demonstrates that the list price could be set anywhere between 0.5 and 2.5 and still 
result in an expected revenue that is above the revenue that can be expected from an auction.  
In other words, even if the seller sets the list price 66% below or 116% above the optimal list 
price, he can still expect a higher profit than had he sold the items through an auction.   
 
 40
Intuitively, the auctions suffer from the low ratio of number of bidders to number of 
items.  As shown in the previous section, the seller has a fifty-fifty chance of receiving 
payment equal to the smallest or the second smallest bidder valuation.  As Appendix A 
showed, these are likely to be small values.  Under the list price system, however, the seller 
has the opportunity to capture higher amounts from high-value bidders.  By setting the price 
above the expected value, he risks having no revenue in some situations but when he does 
make a sale, payments will be large.  A later section will explore under which circumstances 




























List Price Second Price Auction
 
Figure 3.2: Expected revenue of auction vs. list price dependent on the set list price. 
3.6.5. Second Price Auction with Reservation Price 
In an auction with a reservation price we expect the revenue to be at least equal to the greater 
of a pure auction system or a pure list price system since these systems can be emulated by 
simply setting the reservation price to zero or the optimal list price, respectively.  This 
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section demonstrates the additional value that can be derived from an optimally set 
reservation price.  Using equation (9), we find: 
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To maximize expression (11), we need to find [ ]rXXE ≥11  and [ ]rXXE ≥22 .  We start by 
finding [ ]rXXE ≥33 : 
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So we first need: 
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Similarly, for [ ]rXXE ≥11  and [ ]rXXE ≥ , we get: 
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Finally, substituting all these value into equation (11), we get the expected revenue of an 
auction with reservation price: 
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As in the list price case, this expression can be maximized with any Solver.  In the context of 
this numerical example, the optimal reservation price with λ=1 is 0.79 and the resulting 
expected revenue is 1.16.  As expected, this auction with a reservation price creates the 
highest revenue for the seller.  Chapter 4 will further explore the use of reservation prices in 
the proposed auction system for the targeted television advertising system but we now turn to 
some further analysis of this analytical model. 
3.7. COMPARISONS & INSIGHTS 
3.7.1. Introduction 
The previous section demonstrated that, given three bidders with [λ]-exponential value 
distributions, setting an appropriate list price will result in higher revenue than an auction.  
The question remains whether this is true under all situations and how a change in the value 
distribution function or the number of bidders would impact this result.  Furthermore, it is not 
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yet clear how the introduction of “types” shaped the results of this section and how the 
results compare to a standard auction of two items without bidders falling into separate 
categories. 
3.7.2. Bidding Functions 
We begin the analysis of the impact of types by comparing the bidding functions of a first 
price auction for two items with types versus without types. 
Without types, the probability of winning one of the two items is now simply the 
probability PW: 
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In the current example of three bidders with [λ]-exponential value distribution: 
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=  (12) 
We can now answer the question if the auction participants tend to bid higher or lower in a 
scenario with types versus a scenario without types.  Figure 3.3 shows how the optimal bid 
depends on the particular value of the bidder (assuming all bidders derive their value from a 
[1]-exponential distribution) and demonstrates that the answer to the question above depends 
on how high their value is.  The result can be explained intuitively as follows: In an auction 
without types, a bidder that has a low valuation for the item must bid a relatively high 
percentage of his value in order to stand a chance of winning an item that will likely go to a 
bidder with a higher valuation.  With the introduction of types, however, the low-value 
bidder may have the good fortune that all bidders with higher values are of the same type, but 
different than his own type, and that he receives the second flotilla slot even though there are 
bidders with higher valuations for the slot.  The low-value bidder therefore has an incentive 
to shade his bid more and, as a result, the dashed line is above the full line for low valuations. 
In contrast, if a bidder has a high valuation and there are no types, the bidder will not 
bid a high percentage of his value because he is content with receiving the second slot.  With 
multiple types, however, the high-value bidder must consider the possibility of entering the 
second highest bid and discovering that the highest bidder is of the same type and that he has 
lost the chance for an impression.  Therefore, the high-value bidder will try to secure the top 
flotilla slot by bidding a higher percentage of his value, as indicated by the full line being 














































with types without types  
Figure 3.3: Optimal first price bids with and without types dependent on value (λ=1). 
Another observation that can be made from Figure 3.3 is that the bidding functions flatten out 
for high values.  In fact, by letting v go to infinity in equation (10) and (12), we can find the 
highest possible bid: 




































= ; and similarly, 














Therefore, the highest possible bid with types is 7/(8λ) and without types is 1/(2λ).  Since the 
expected value of a [λ]-exponential random variable is 1/λ, we can conclude that bidders in 
auctions with and without types will never bid above 87.5% and 50% of the expected item 
value, respectively – even if their own value is far above the average. 
It is worthwhile to note that the introduction of types does not change the bidding 
behaviour in a second price auction where truth-telling remains the optimal strategy.  




Bidding behaviour is also heavily impacted by the value distribution.  To illustrate this 
point, the following calculations show the optimal bidding function if the bidders’ values are 
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Figure 3.4 compares the bidding functions resulting from the previous [1]-exponential 
distribution with the bidding functions resulting from a [0.5]-exponential distribution, a 
[0.5,1.5]-uniform distribution and a [0.5,3.5]-uniform distribution.  The thin lines and the 
thick lines in Figure 3.4 are bidding functions that stem from value distributions with the 


































Figure 3.4: Optimal first price bids given four different value distributions. 
Figure 3.4 provides two main insights: first, bidders whose valuation of the item is close to 
the mean bid more aggressively if the distribution has a lower standard deviation.  This is 
intuitive because bid shading significantly reduces the probability of winning if most other 
bidders are likely to have values close to their own value.  Second, and perhaps less intuitive, 
if the mean of the bidders’ value distribution for the item increases, the bid function does not 
always move upwards.  In particular, for lower values, the optimal bid function is now below 
the bid function given the lower mean value distribution function; only for higher values is 
the optimal bid function above the previous bid function.  This is best explained by the fact 
that in the high-mean scenario, bidders that have low valuations are unlikely to attain the 
item unless the “types” work in their favour and they attain the second slot because all other 
bidders are of the same type but different from them.  For bidders with higher valuations, the 
increase in the mean fuels the attempt to secure the top flotilla slot. 
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3.7.3. Seller Revenue 
While the discussion on bidding behaviour has provided some interesting insights, the more 
important question is what impact the introduction of types has on the expected revenue and 
how the seller’s expected revenue depends on the value distributions of the bidders as well as 
the number of bidders.  Moreover, the ultimate question is whether the seller should set a list 
price or run an auction to sell the flotilla slots. 
Using a similar approach as in the derivation of equation (5) and (6), the expected 
revenue, if no types exist, is: 






Further, with 3 bidders for two items without types, the probability of winning is simply 1 - 
the probability of being the third highest bidder: 
 ( ) ( ) xW exRxP λ22 11 −−=−=  
Now, using equation (12): 
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By comparing this amount to the expected revenue with types of 7/(12λ), it is evident that the 
introduction of types has decreased the expected revenue by 1/(12λ), or 12.5%, from the 
standard auction without types.  This relatively small decrease in expected revenue may be 
surprising since types have introduced the possibility of only one of two items being sold.  
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However, this finding can be explained by the fact that types have also increased the 
competition for the top flotilla slot (since order matters). 
With regards to the type of auction, the previous numerical example demonstrated that 
the choice between a first or second price auction has no impact on the expected revenue.  
However, this will only hold as long as the conditions of the revenue equivalence theorem 
hold.  In light of the large number of auctions that will occur over time, risk neutrality of 
bidders seems to be a valid assumption.  Advertisers will be less concerned with the outcome 
of individual auctions but will instead try to maximize their expected utility over many 
auctions, displaying risk neutrality.  In comparison, bidders who are participating in a one-
time auction for an expensive item are typically risk averse.  If they are not able to secure the 
item, they do not have a second chance.  This danger outweighs the drawback of a smaller 
profit which makes them bid higher than a risk neutral bidder would. 
And, as mentioned in Chapter 2, advertisers have their own private values regarding 
how much an impression is worth.  Without primary research, it is unclear whether 
advertisers draw their values from the same distribution; however, if we assume that they do 
and implement any auction model under which payments are dictated by bids alone, the 
expected revenue will always be the same. 
The earlier numerical example also showed that given three bidders with [λ]-
exponential value distributions, setting a list price will – on average – result in 60% more 
revenue than selling the item by auction (0.93/λ vs. 0.58/λ).  However, Figure 3.5 shows that 
this superiority reverses as the number of bidders increases.  Once more than five bidders 
exist in the market place, an auction will result in more revenue for the seller than a list price 
system.  As mentioned before, an auction model that includes a reservation price will result 
in even higher revenue than a pure auction or list price system.  This knowledge will have an 
impact on the recommendations given in Chapter 4. 
Another observation that can be made from Figure 3.5 is the rapid increase in revenue 
when the number of bidders increases from three to about ten with decreasing rate of returns 
thereafter.  This holds true regardless of λ; in particular, the expected revenue is always a 
multiple of 1/λ.  For example, if λ was 0.5 instead of 1, the seller could expect double the 
revenue (for each respective number of bidders).  This sharp increase on the left hand side of 
the graph is a reflection of two negative effects that a small number of bidders have on 
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revenue (from the seller’s perspective): first, given a second price auction, there is a 
significant chance that there will only be a small number of bidders with high values who 
will merely have to pay the bids of low-value bidders.  Congruently, in a first price auction, 
high-value bidders are aware of their high chance of winning the item even with a low bid.  
Second, a low number of bidders increases the chance that all bidders are of the same type 






















Second Price Auction List price  
Figure 3.5: Expected revenue of auction vs. list price (λ=1). 
Because the actual distribution of advertisers’ values for advertising slots is unknown, a 
number of distributions were tested and are displayed in Figure 3.6.  The graph compares the 
[1]-exponential distribution to a [0.5,1.5]-uniform and a [1,0.1]-normal distribution in a 
second price auction setting. 
The difference in expected revenue is particularly large when a small or large number 
of bidders exist in the market.  When only a small number exists, there is a significant chance 
that winners will only have to pay amounts that are at the low end of the distribution.  In the 
case of an exponential distribution, the left-hand tail end is very wide and bidders may only 
have to pay a very small amount.  In comparison, with the [0.5, 1.5]-uniform distribution, 
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bidders will never pay less than 0.5 and, even with only three bidders, the seller can expect to 
receive revenue of almost 1 (without types, this would be at least 1 but with types the 
probability of paying 0 exists). 
Similarly, with many bidders in the market, the probability increases that bidders will 
have to pay prices at the high end of the distribution.  This is particularly profitable for the 
seller if the distribution has a wide open tail on the right-hand; as a result, bidders whose 
values are derived from an exponential distribution will end up paying prices far beyond a 
scenario with bidders whose values are derived from a uniform distribution.  
Following the reasoning above, distributions with higher variances should result in 
higher revenue as the number of bidders increases.  Given a large number of bidders, revenue 
is increasing in variance.  Since the variance of an exponential distribution is 1/λ2, the 
variance of a uniform distribution is (b-a)2/12 (where a and b are the upper and lower bound 
of the distribution), and the variance of a normal distribution is σ2 (where σ is the standard 
deviation of the distribution), the variance of the three distributions shown in Figure 3.6 are 























[1]-Exponential [0.5,1.5]-Uniform [1,0.1]-Normal  
Figure 3.6: Expected revenue of second price auction for three value distributions. 
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To explore the relationship between revenue and variance of the value distributions further, 
Figure 3.7 compares three normal distributions, each with a mean of 1 but with standard 
deviation of 0.1, 0.2 and 0.4 respectively.  The same effect as described above is clearly 




















[1,0.4]-Normal [1,0.2]-Normal [1,0.1]-Normal  
Figure 3.7: Expected revenue of second price auction for three normal value distributions. 
3.8. CONCLUSIONS AND CAVEATS 
Even though the analytical model of this section does not capture all complexities of the 
targeted television advertising system, it provides a model that allows a mathematical 
analysis and several insights.  The following sections highlight the main insights and how 
they should impact the seller’s decision making. 
3.8.1. Auction Model versus List Price System 
The primary decision that the seller needs to make is whether to sell the flotilla slots using a 
list price system or whether to sell them through an auction.  From a revenue perspective, an 
auction will lead to a better outcome as soon as the number of bidders exceeds a handful.  
This statement remains true regardless of the actual value distribution of the bidders, as 
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shown in Appendix C.  Furthermore, the list price system will perform even more poorly as 
the set list price deviates more from the optimal.  This deviation may be intentional to 
achieve rounded prices.  Or the deviation may be unintentional as a result of inaccurate 
approximations of the bidders’ value distribution function.  The seller should be aware that 
setting the list price too low decreases the revenue faster than setting the price too high.  This 
can be concluded by comparing the steep slope before the optimal list price in Figure 3.2 
with a flatter slope after the optimal list price.  As a result, the seller is better off setting a 
higher price if they are uncertain about the optimal list price.  Regardless of the cause and 
direction of the deviation from the optimal list price, any deviation will further decrease the 
expected revenue from the above results. 
As mentioned before, there are other factors that will impact the choice between the 
two systems.  A list price system will provide advertisers with the comfort of knowing that 
they have secured a certain number of impressions but burdens the seller with the obligation 
to fulfill this implied promise of service as well as to determine an appropriate price.  The 
auction system, on the other hand, will guarantee an efficient allocation of flotilla slots – 
removing that burden from the seller – but it may result in unsatisfied advertisers who have 
become accustomed to the status quo.  Ultimately, there are some strategy decisions that will 
have to be made in this regard by the seller but Chapter 4 will provide some further economic 
insight into this decision. 
Should the seller decide to proceed with an auction model, the next major decision will 
lie in the choice of auction model.  This section has provided evidence that the choice of 
auction model will not impact the expected revenue given that the benchmark model 
assumptions hold.  The one feature of the auction system that will impact the profits, 
however, is the inclusion of a reservation price.  In particular when there are a low number of 
bidders, a reservation price can increase the expected revenue significantly as will be 
demonstrated in Chapter 4. 
3.8.2. Number of Types 
The analysis of this chapter is based on only two “types”, whereas the actual bidders in 
targeted television advertising system will be of several more types.  Depending on the 
permitted detail of specification, there could be 18 types (two gender and nine age cohorts) or 
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even 180 types (two gender, nine age cohorts and ten income cohorts).  This might lead the 
reader to conclude that with 180 types, the number of bidders may have to be as high as two 
or three times that amount (or 500) for an auction model to outperform a list price system.  
However, there is another variable that determines the optimal system – namely the number 
of flotilla slots. 
In the analytical model studied above, two types of bidders competed for two flotilla 
slots which means that, in effect, each type was only competing with other members of its 
type.  Since advertisers do not desire the same viewers as advertisers of the other type and 
there are flotilla slots for both types, they do not compete with each other.  If we were to add 
a third type, the situation would change.  An advertiser trying to secure a flotilla slot would 
not only have to outbid advertisers of the same type but would also have to ensure that his 
bid is higher than the highest bid of at least one of the two other types.  With a Vickrey 
auction, this would not affect the bidding behaviour (always truth-telling) but it would have 
an effect on seller revenue.  In fact, assuming an equal number of total bidders, the more 
types that exist, the more revenue the seller can expect.  On the one end of the spectrum, if 
the number of types is equal to the number of bidders, then the seller will receive the same 
expected revenue as in a system without types, namely twice the value of the third highest 
bidder (assuming two flotilla slots).  On the other end, with only one type of bidder, only one 
flotilla slot can be sold and the seller will only receive the value of the second highest bidder 
once.  So if the targeted television advertising system consisted of four flotilla slots, the 
model predicts that if the number of bidders exceeds about ten, higher revenue can be 
expected in an auction system compared to a list price system.  This question will be 
addressed in greater detail in Chapter 4. 
3.8.3. Value Distributions 
This chapter also illustrated the impact that the advertisers’ value distributions have on 
expected revenue.  If there are sufficient advertisers participating in the auction, the seller 
would benefit if these advertisers draw their values from a distribution with a high rather than 
a low standard deviation, and vice versa if there are less bidders participating.  It is hard to 
predict with great accuracy what type of value distribution advertisers will have without 
undertaking primary market research.  In addition, the additional complexities of the targeted 
 
 57
television advertising system that were mentioned earlier may impact expected revenue so 
more detailed findings will be reported in Chapter 4. 
3.8.4. Additional Complexities 
The actual system under which the seller will operate encompasses three additional 
complexities which were not captured in this section; namely, each auction will be part of a 
series of auctions, there is a link between receiving a flotilla slot and actual impressions, and 
types may overlap.  Overlapping types can occur as, for example, one advertiser targets 
females of ages 18-34 while another advertiser is targeting females of ages 25-49.  With 
respect to impressions, a flotilla slot does not guarantee a certain static number of 
impressions in the actual targeted television advertising system.  These complexities demand 
more detailed rules for any considered auction model and complicate the analysis 





4. SMART MARKET AUCTION DESIGN 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
The actual system under which the targeted television advertising will operate has some 
significant differences to the model described in Chapter 3 and this will add a number of 
complications.  Because these complexities prohibit the mathematical derivation of closed 
form solutions, this section uses Monte Carlo simulations to derive insights to the problem.  
The complexities that need to be added to the previous model of Chapter 3 are the impact of 
multiple auctions in a row, the link between impressions and a flotilla slot and the existence 
of overlapping types. 
4.1.1. Series of Auctions 
One dimension of the problem omitted in the Chapter 3 model was that these auctions will 
actually occur repeatedly over time as avails occur in the cable operator’s video stream.  
Advertisers typically engage in advertising campaigns that span weeks and will therefore 
participate in a large number of these auctions.  Such a series of auctions can have a negative 
effect on a first price auction system.  As became evident in the previous chapter, bidders in a 
first price auction shade their bids, bidding an amount less than their actual valuation.  Since 
all bidders are shading their bids, a winning bid may actually be lower than the value of a 
losing bidder.  In a one-time auction, the losing bidder cannot react to this knowledge 
because the outcome is revealed after the auction.  In a series of auctions, however, the 
losing bidder can increase his bid to win an item in the following auction.  But this will cause 
the previous winner to react by increasing his bid as well, which in return will trigger other 
reactions.  Consequently, the auction system becomes very unstable with constantly changing 
bids.   
4.1.2. Link between Impressions and Flotilla Slot 
The previous model assumed that advertisers have a certain value for a flotilla slot.  In truth, 
however, advertisers have a certain value for impressions and they can only acquire 
impressions by securing a flotilla slot.  The reason this distinction is important is that the 
number of impressions derived from a flotilla slot is not constant over time and differs by 
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type.  For example, at a particular time, there may be five adult females, ten adult males and 
three viewers under the age of 18 in the system available to view an advertisement.  As a 
result, an advertiser targeting adult females who secures a flotilla slot will receive five 
impressions, an advertiser targeting adult males who secures a flotilla slot will receive ten 
impressions, and an advertiser targeting viewers under the age of 18 who secures a flotilla 
slot will receive only three impressions.  Assuming two flotilla slots, the number of total 
impressions available depends on which advertisers win slots in the flotilla.   
4.1.3. Overlapping Types 
In the previous chapter, only two types were assumed (males and females).  As mentioned 
earlier, a more accurate model needs to be able to accommodate a much larger number of 
types.  While this could be done quite easily using the model of chapter 3, the full model 
must also be able to accommodate overlapping types.  For example, there may be three types: 
males, females, and a type encompassing both males and females.  Under this scenario, let us 
assume that an advertiser targeting males secures the top flotilla slot.  Clearly, all other 
advertisers targeting males have lost interest in the bottom flotilla slot and all advertisers 
targeting females are still as interested in the bottom flotilla.  The difficult question to answer 
is how much value advertisers targeting males and females together will still have for the 
bottom flotilla slot.  If they secure the slot, they will only reach females, or half their target.   
The effect of this on the evaluation of the flotilla slot by these types of advertisers is 
uncertain: they may be willing to pay more than half the original bid if they value female 
impressions higher than male impressions; or, they may be willing to pay less than half the 
original bid if the value female impressions lower or are generally a balance between the two 
genders. 
4.1.4. Motivating Example 
To help understand the complexities of this model, a motivating example has been 
constructed and will be used to demonstrate the difficulty of the problem.  In this example, 
there are four advertisers (represented in the columns of Table 4.1), one targeting males of 
ages 25 to 55, one targeting males between the age of 18 to 49, one targeting all females and 
one targeting all males.  The rows of Table 4.1 represent viewers in the system by gender and 
age.  The table totals the number of impressions available to each advertiser and multiplies 
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this with the submitted bid, which is the amount advertisers are bidding to pay per 
impression, to calculate the total payment each advertiser is willing to make for a flotilla slot 
(assuming that he receives all appropriate viewers).  Note that the amount of bid shading 
(difference between submitted bid and the value of the object) has been chosen arbitrarily.  
As an example, the advertiser targeting males of ages 18 to 49 faces three appropriate 
viewers (Male 18, Male 30 and Male 20) and values each possible impression at 0.55; since 
he has submitted a bid of 0.40 per impression, he is willing to pay 1.20 for a flotilla slot if he 
receives all three impressions. 
Advertisers targeting
Males 25-55 Males 18-49 Females Males
Male 18 0 1 0 1
Male 50 1 0 0 1
Male 30 1 1 0 1
Male 55 1 0 0 1
Male 20 0 1 0 1
Femal 40 0 0 1 0
Total Impressions 3 3 1 5
Value of Object 0.65 0.55 0.60 0.05
Submitted Bid 0.50 0.40 0.45 0.01







Table 4.1: Example 1 – Full Information Matrix. 
The challenge for the seller is to determine which two of the four advertisers receive flotilla 
slots (as well as their order) and how much to charge them for this slot.  Since the goal is to 
promote truth-telling in the bidding behaviour (to create a stable system and increase 
revenue), advertisers must be charged a fair amount else they will revert to bid shading.  To 
illustrate the difficulty of this problem, the following paragraphs describe various ways of 
conducting the auction and the resulting issues that could arise. 
First price auction by submitted bid – Using the methodology of Chapter 3, the seller 
could declare the highest bidder, Males 25-55, to be the winner of the auction and have them 
pay their bid amounts of 0.50 per impression.  Similarly, the next flotilla slot would go to 
advertiser Females for cost of 0.45 per impression.  In a one-shot auction, this might be a 
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valid outcome; however, the repetition of this auction over time will cause the system to 
become unstable.  Even though a future avail will not have an identical composition of 
viewers available, advertisers can learn from the previous auction outcome and adjust their 
bids accordingly.  For example, advertiser Males 18-49 will realize that if he increases his 
bid from 0.40 to 0.51, he can capture three impressions at a price that is still below his value 
of 0.55.  Facing increased bids from his competitors, advertiser Males 25-55 will react by 
increasing his bid, too.  However, if the other advertisers reduce their bids, or end their 
campaign, advertiser Males 25-55 will realize that he is paying more than necessary to win 
his flotilla slot, therefore reduce his bid and allow the cycle to start over again.  The result of 
such an unstable system is an increasing amount of effort that advertisers put into gaming the 
system.  This effort comes at a price which is typically passed on to the seller (Edelman and 
Ostrovsky, 2007) and may also cause advertiser frustration. 
Second price auction by submitted bid – To solve this problem, the seller could declare the 
highest bid the winner of the top flotilla slot and make the winner pay the next highest bid of 
his type.  Realizing the strategy dominance of truth-telling, advertisers’ will submit bids 
equal to their respective values of the objects.  Table 4.2 provides the updated bids and total 
payments for this example (the type and number of viewers has not changed). 
Advertisers targeting
Males 25-55 Males 18-49 Females Males
Total Impressions 3 3 1 5
Submitted Bid 0.65 0.55 0.60 0.05
Total Payment 1.95 1.65 0.60 0.25  
Table 4.2: Example 1 – Condensed matrix with updated bids. 
When trying to apply this methodology to the example shown in Table 4.1, we face the 
earlier described problem of overlapping types: advertiser Males 25-55 is the highest bidder 
(0.65), will therefore receive the top flotilla slot, and must pay the bid of the second highest 
bidder of his type; however, there is no bidder of precisely his type.  A solution to this 
problem will be presented later but for now let us assume that for billing purposes any 
multiple types with overlapping demographics will be considered to be of the same type.  As 
a result, advertiser Males 25-55 is charged the bid of advertiser Males 18-49, namely 0.55 for 
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each impression for a total of 1.65.  Similarly, the bottom slot of the flotilla goes to the 
second highest bid, advertiser Females with a bid of 0.60, for the price of zero since there is 
no other advertiser of this type.  Clearly, this is not a good outcome since there are two other 
advertisers that are willing to pay more than zero, namely 0.55 and 0.05 per impression.  As 
mentioned in an earlier discussion, if more types than flotilla slots exist, advertisers will start 
competing not only against other advertisers of their type but against all other advertisers.  
Therefore, advertiser Females should be charged the next highest bid of 0.55 per impression 
for a total of 0.55. 
The problem with applying the methodology of Chapter 3 in this more complex setting 
is the fact that there now exists a link between a flotilla slot and the resulting impressions – 
ignoring this link can cause inefficiencies in raising revenue.  For example, advertiser Males 
18-49 is willing to pay more than advertiser Females for the second flotilla slot because 
although he submitted a slightly smaller bid per impression, there are many more impressions 
available to him.  Ignoring this fact leaves “money on the table” because an advertiser with a 
large number of appropriate viewers may be left out of the flotilla because is bid was slightly 
below another bidder who has very viewer appropriate viewers in the system.  While the 
seller may receive more revenue per impression if the latter wins, the total revenue will be 
less than if the former advertiser had won.  
Second price auction by next highest total payment – An obvious solution to this problem 
is to determine winners by total payment instead of submitted bid.  In the above example, 
advertiser Males 25-55 still wins the top flotilla slot (he has the highest total payment of 
1.95) and is charged 1.65 (the next highest total payment of his type).  Before determining 
the winner of the bottom flotilla slot, we need to update Table 4.1 since some of the viewers 
have been captured by the winning advertiser and are no longer available.  Table 4.2 shows 





Males 25-55 Males 18-49 Females Males
Male 18 0 1 0 1
Male 50 1 0 0 0
Male 30 1 0 0 0
Male 55 1 0 0 0
Male 20 0 1 0 1
Femal 40 0 0 1 0
Total Impressions 3 2 1 2
Submitted Bid 0.65 0.55 0.60 0.05







Table 4.3: Example 1 – Revised full information matrix. 
The table shows that the bottom flotilla slot will go to advertiser Males 18-49 for the price of 
0.60 (again, this advertiser is competing against all other bidders since the number of types 
exceeds the number of flotilla slots). 
Unfortunately, our assumption that, for billing purposes, overlapping types will be 
treated as the same type creates unfair results.  While advertiser Males 25-55 will end up 
paying 0.55 (1.65/3) per impression, advertiser Males 18-49 will only pay 0.30 (0.60/2) per 
impression even though they are targeting similar demographics and their bid differ by only 
0.10.  Knowing that these kinds of outcomes are possible, advertiser Males 25-55 may have 
an incentive to shade his bid; for example, had he reduced his bid to 0.50, advertiser Males 
18-49 would have won the top flotilla slot, paid 1.50 for three impressions, and advertiser 
Males 25-55 would have received the bottom flotilla slot and paid only 0.60 for two 
impressions.  In other words, this type of bid shading would have left advertiser Males 25-55 
with 33% less impressions but with a price reduction of over 45% per impression. 
Second price auction by third highest total payment – One possible solution to this 
problem would be to charge both winning advertisers the amount of the third highest total 
payment.  In this case, the winner is still advertiser Males 25-55 and the second flotilla slot 
goes to advertiser Males 18-49.  Both pay 0.60, which implies a cost per impression of 0.20 
and 0.30 respectively.  However, this is a poor result since advertiser Males 18-49 is willing 
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to pay 0.55 for each impression, including the viewer Male 30 who is captured by advertiser 
Males 25-55 for only 0.20. 
In addition to the above issues, it may not be appropriate to use the submitted bid of 
advertiser Males 18-49 once advertiser Males 25-55 has secured the top flotilla slot.  The 
original bid reflected the desire to reach all males in the appropriate age group.  However, the 
winning advertiser captured all males above 25 years of age.  Consequently, advertiser Males 
18-49 can only capture males between the ages of 18 to 24 which may impact the price he is 
willing to pay per impression.  Ignoring this issue may lead to undesirable consequences: 
advertisers targeting broad demographic groups, such as all males, may reduce their bid in 
anticipation of receiving impressions only from less sought-after demographic groups.  
Alternatively, these advertisers may break down their bid into multiple bids for more specific 
demographics.  This segmentation can lead to inefficiencies as it is possible that the same 
advertiser receives multiple flotilla slots when one slot would have been sufficient. 
One solution to this problem would be to allow the advertiser to indicate whether his 
bid reflects his expectation to receive a representative share of each subgroup within his 
target demographic (i.e., no advertiser of an overlapping type may be in any of the flotilla 
slots above him) or whether he values all demographic subgroups equally and is indifferent 
toward the proportion of demographic subgroups he receives within his target group.   
Another issue illustrated above is the fact that bidders may be able to achieve 
substantial cost savings (or increase in profit) in return for a slightly lower number of total 
impressions.  In the above example, advertiser Males 25-55 could game the system to pay 
0.60 for two impressions, rather than 1.65 for three impressions.  Since he values each 
impression at 0.65, his total profit would increase to 0.70 (0.65*2 - 0.60), from 0.30 (0.65*3 - 
1.65).  Alternatively, a scenario could be constructed in which a bidder may be able to 
achieve cost savings per impression (receiving fewer, but cheaper impressions) while his 
overall profit (value minus cost) decreases.  Given that a series of auctions will occur over 
time, the argument could be made that a bidder may be willing to sacrifice overall profit in a 
single auction because over time he can still achieve all his desired impressions, but at a 
lower cost.  To deal with this problem, the following assumption was made for the remainder 
of this chapter: within the range of the possible number of impressions, advertisers value the 
number of impressions uniformly.  In other words, the first impression they receive is as 
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valuable to them as the second impression, which is as valuable to them as the last 
impression they receive.  Therefore, within any given auction, their goal is to maximize total 
profit, not profit per impression.  However, the seller still needs an auction system that 
charges the advertisers appropriately. 
Vickrey-Clark-Groves mechanism – The mechanism that is known in the literature to 
induce truth-telling and allocate items efficiently in a multi-item situation is the VCG 
mechanism.  Under this system, bidders are charged the opportunity cost that they impose on 
other bidders.  In the context of this motivating example, the VCG mechanism would work 
as follows: first, the combination of bidders yielding the highest revenue would be selected, 
in this case advertisers Males 25-55 and Males 18-49.  To determine the payment of 
advertiser Males 25-55 (received the top flotilla slot), we find the additional payments that 
other advertisers would have made without the former being present in the system.  In this 
case, advertiser Males 18-49 and advertiser Females would have won the auction, which 
means that advertiser Males 18-49 would have gained one more impression (the 30 year old 
male) at 0.55 and advertiser Females would have gained a flotilla slot to capture one 
impression at 0.60.  Therefore, advertiser Males 25-55 would be charged 1.15 (0.55 - 0.60).  
Similarly, advertiser Males 18-49 would be charged at 0.60 (without him, advertiser Females 
could capture a flotilla slot and one impression). 
Unfortunately, the VCG mechanism has some downsides as well.  In particular, it is 
vulnerable to shill bidding in which advertisers submit artificial bids to influence the 
outcome positively for them.  The following example demonstrates this possibility.  In Table 
4.4 there are three advertisers and each has indicated that they are not willing to accept 
overlapping types in the flotilla slots above them.  According to the VCG mechanism, 
advertiser Males 25-55 wins the top flotilla slots and advertiser Females wins the bottom slot.  
Advertiser Males 25-55 must pay 1.25 since he is depriving advertiser Males of a flotilla slot 





Males 25-55 Females Males
Male 18 0 0 1
Male 50 1 0 1
Male 30 1 0 1
Male 55 1 0 1
Male 20 0 0 1
Femal 40 0 1 0
Total Impressions 3 1 5
Submitted Bid 0.65 0.05 0.25







Table 4.4: Example 2 – Full information matrix. 
In this situation, advertiser Males 25-55 has an incentive to submit a shill bid targeting Males 
18-24 as shown in Table 4.5. 
Advertisers targeting
Males 25-55 Males 18-24 Females Males
Male 18 0 1 0 1
Male 50 1 0 0 1
Male 30 1 0 0 1
Male 55 1 0 0 1
Male 20 0 1 0 1
Femal 40 0 0 1 0
Total Impressions 3 2 1 5
Submitted Bid 0.65 0.65 0.05 0.25







Table 4.5: Example 2 – Full information matrix with shill bid. 
As a result, advertiser Males 25-55 wins his real bid and his shill bid targeting Males 18-49.  
For his real bid, he must now pay only 0.05 (without him, the flotilla slots would go to his 
shill bid and advertiser Females), and for his shill bid he must also pay 0.05 (without his shill 
bid, the slots go to his real bid and advertiser Females).  As a result, he now only pays 0.10 
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instead of 1.25 and he gets more impressions.  Obviously, this would be a very negative 
consequence for the seller. 
Some of these concerns have led other companies such as Google and Yahoo! to invent 
their own auction rules (Edelman, Ostrovsky and Schwarz, 2007).  The following section 
describes a number of proposed auction models that are aimed to solve the described 
challenges of implementing an auction into this system while maximizing revenue to the 
seller. 
4.2. PROPOSED SMART MARKET AUCTIONS 
4.2.1. Introduction and Notation 
To enable a clear description of the auction models, the following notation will be used:  
H Number of households. 
A Number of advertisers. 
S Number of slots in the flotilla. 
Va Value per impression of advertiser a. 
Ta,h Is 1 if household h is in target audience of advertiser a, else 0. 
Za Is the sum of the target audience multiplied with the respective value for each 
advertiser a; aTVZ
h
haaa ∀= ∑ , . 
These models will assume that advertisers bid truthfully so that their bids are equal to their 
values for impressions.  As mentioned before, the new targeted television advertising system 
will run as a smart market in which the outcomes of the auctions are determined 
automatically through a computer program.  Advertisers are not participating directly in these 
auctions (there will be hundreds of these automatic auctions a day) but instead advertisers 
provide bids that will be taken into account automatically in multiple small auctions.  
Therefore, interactive auction models such as ascending auctions are not part of this analysis 
and only sealed bid auctions are considered.  The proposed auction models are first 
introduced and then compared computationally in a later section. 
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4.2.2. Second Largest Ad 
A simple second price auction implementation could emulate the Google system described 
by Edelman, Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2007).  In such a system, the advertiser that will create 
the highest revenue (the highest Z) will receive the top flotilla slot and pay the second highest 
revenue raised by any advertiser (the second highest Z).  After the first winner has been 
determined, all households that have been captured by this advertiser are removed from the 
system.  Because they are no longer accessible to other advertisers, all Z values will have to 
be recalculated.  At this point, the winner of the next flotilla slot can be determined using the 
same method as before (highest Z wins and pays second highest Z).  This cycle continues 
until all flotilla slots have been filled.  The algorithm Second Largest Ad shows these steps in 
a more precise mathematical form. 
Algorithm Second Largest Ad 
1. Initialize 
1.a. Sort all Z from highest to lowest so Z1 is the highest 
1.b. Sort all V and T to be in congruence with the ordered Z’s; i.e. aZTV a
h
haa ∀=∑ ,  
2. Determine winner and payment 
2.a. Z1 receives first free flotilla slot 
2.b. Z1 must pay Z2 
3. Remove previous winner 
3.a. Set Z1 = 0 
3.b. Set T2,h .. TA,h to zero for all h where T1,h = 1 
3.c. Recalculate Z2 … ZA 
3.d. Resort Z1… ZA (and all V and T accordingly) 
4. Terminate algorithm 
4.a. If another free flotilla slot exists 
4.a.1. Return to step 2 
4.b. Else 




The problem with this algorithm is its failure to address the effect of types; i.e., the advertiser 
placed in the top flotilla slot may capture most of the next highest advertiser’s target viewers 
or he may capture none of them.  A small example will demonstrate why this matters. 
Imagine a situation with two flotilla slots and three advertisers, two of which have very 
high values (advertiser A and B, with A slightly higher than B) and one of very low value 
(advertiser C).  If advertiser A and B are targeting the same demographic, advertiser A will 
capture the first flotilla slot and pay the Z of advertiser B.  Since the target demographic of 
advertiser B has now been captured, advertiser B will no longer have interest in the auction 
and advertiser C will receive the second flotilla slot for a price of zero.  In this scenario, the 
algorithm does promote truth-telling as the advertisers cannot gain from shading their bid.  
However, a slight change in the previous scenario reveals the weakness of the algorithm. 
Let us assume the same situation as before, except that advertiser A and B are now 
targeting different demographics.  In this case, advertiser A still captures the first flotilla slot 
and pays the Z of advertiser B.  However, advertiser B remains interested in the auction and 
secures the second flotilla slot for the Z of advertiser C.  Since advertiser B had a very high 
value and advertiser C a very low value, this outcome implies that advertiser A will pay a 
high price and advertiser B a low price.  In this situation, advertiser A would rather be in 
advertiser B’s position because he would still get the identical number of impressions but for 
a much lower price.  Therefore, advertiser A will shade his bid in an attempt to make a bid 
below advertiser B and secure the second flotilla slot.  As proven by example, this algorithm 
is no longer a truth revealing mechanism. 
4.2.3. Reimburse 
One method of solving the deficiency of the previous algorithm is to charge the winning 
advertisers an amount congruent with the number of viewers he is “taking away” from other 
advertisers.  The winner is still determined by the advertiser with the highest Z but his 
payment is now calculated as follows: for each non-winning advertiser the sum of their target 
viewers captured by the winning ad is calculated and multiplied with their value to derive Z*.  
The winner (highest Z) must pay the highest of these Z*s.  Once the winner has been 
determined, he is removed from the system together with all the viewers he captured.  Then 
the process is started over to determine the next winner. 
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In the previous example, if the top two advertisers are targeting the same demographic, 
this algorithm will force the winner to make a high payment (since he is taking away many 
viewers from the second highest advertiser).  On the other hand, if the top two advertisers are 
targeting different demographics, then the winner will only have to pay a smaller amount 
(depending on how many viewers he is taking away from other advertisers).  Since his 
payment now only depends on other bidders, this is a truth promoting mechanism.  Below is 
a detailed description of algorithm Reimburse. 
Algorithm Reimburse 
1. Initialize 
1.a. Sort all Z from highest to lowest so Z1 is the highest 
1.b. Sort all V and T to be in congruence with the ordered Z’s; i.e. aZTV a
h
haa ∀=∑ ,  
2. Determine winner and payment 
2.a. Z1 receives first free flotilla slot 
2.b. Set T*a,h = Ta,h * T1,h for all a ≠ 1 and all h 
2.c. Set aTXZ
h
haaa ∀= ∑ ,**  
2.d. Sort all Z* from highest to lowest so Z*1 is the highest 
2.e. Z1 must pay Z*1 
3. Remove previous winner 
3.a. Set Z1 = 0 
3.b. Set T2,h .. TA,h to zero for all h where T1,h = 1 
3.c. Recalculate Z2 … ZA 
3.d. Resort Z1… ZA (and all V and T accordingly) 
4. Terminate algorithm 
4.a. If another free flotilla slot exists 
4.a.1. Return to step 2 
4.b. Else 




While not immediately apparent, later calculations will show that this algorithm will 
frequently result in low revenue for the seller.  The revised algorithm, described below, leads 
to higher revenue while maintaining the truth-telling property. 
4.2.4. Reimburse Revised 
The idea behind this revision is that the sale of the last flotilla slot has special implications.  
The ad that captures the last flotilla slot does not only seize the advertiser’s particular 
demographic but, in effect, takes away the chance to capture any demographic from all other 
advertisers.  Therefore, the winning ad of the final slot should pay the next highest Z (instead 
of the highest Z*), as shown in algorithm Reimburse Revised. 
Algorithm Reimburse Revised 
1. Initialize 
1.a. Sort all Z from highest to lowest so Z1 is the highest 
1.b. Sort all V and T to be in congruence with the ordered Zs; i.e. aZTV a
h
haa ∀=∑ ,  
2. Determine winner and payment 
2.a. Z1 receives first free flotilla slot 
2.b. If a free slot remains 
2.b.1. Set T*a,h = Ta,h * T1,h for all a ≠ 1 and all h 
2.b.2. Set aTVZ
h
haaa ∀= ∑ ,**  
2.b.3. Sort all Z* from highest to lowest so Z*1 is the highest 
2.b.4. Z1 must pay Z*1 
2.c. Else 
2.c.1. Z1 must pay Z2 
3. Remove previous winner 
3.a. Set Z1 = 0 
3.b. Set T2,h .. TA,h to zero for all h where T1,h = 1 
3.c. Recalculate Z2 … ZA 
3.d. Resort Z1… ZA (and all V and T accordingly) 
4. Terminate algorithm 
 
 72
4.a. If another free flotilla slot exists 
4.a.1. Return to step 2 
4.b. Else 
4.b.1. Terminate algorithm 
 
4.2.5. Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism 
The next smart market auction that will be tested is the previously described VCG 
mechanism.  Through the literature we know that the VCG mechanism is a truth revealing 
mechanism and it will be useful as a benchmark for the other proposed smart market 
auctions.  An implementation of the VCG mechanism in the targeted television advertising 
system would consist of the following steps: 
1. Find optimal combination of ads for the flotilla and their positions within the flotilla 
a. Save the resulting revenue R, given that each ad must pay his bid multiplied 
with his received impressions 
2. For each of the winning ads W: 
a. Remove Advertiserw from the system and find the new optimal combination of 
ads 
b. Save the resulting revenue Rw 
c. Advertiserw must pay the amount that he contributed to R (his bid * his 
impressions) minus the difference between R and Rw 
In words, the payment that advertisers will have to make is their bid reduced by the 
additional revenue that they bring to the system.   
As Step 1 of the VCG mechanism shows, we need an optimization model to determine 
the winning ads.  Below is a non-linear integer programming optimization model that 
accomplishes this task. 
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Non-linear Integer Programming Optimization Model – VCG 
Model parameters 
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The reason that the objective function is non-linear lies in the way that the flotilla 
advertisement ordering influences which ad will be seen.  Each ad a contributes its value per 
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kihk xT .   Note that if any higher ranked ad 
has captured the household, the last term becomes 0 and else it becomes 1. 
While this formulation is relatively compact, non-linear integer optimization models 
are challenging to solve (Hromkovic, 2001).  Therefore, this formulation is not practical for 
the seller’s purposes as solving any iteration of this problem can easily exceed the time 
period that the seller has between receiving the inputs and having to construct the flotilla.  
The actual computational times required will be explored in a later section; however, first a 
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linearization of the problem was attempted.  One way of making non-linear formulations 
linear is to add additional decision variables.  The next formulation is now a linear integer 
programming optimization model. 
Linear Integer Programming Optimization Model – VCG 
Model parameters 
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Due to its linear nature, this optimization model will solve much faster; however, integer 




4.2.6. Reservation Prices 
As Chapter 3 showed, revenue can be increased further through an appropriate reservation 
price.  In this case, a reservation price would imply that all advertisers with values below this 
price will not participate in the auction.  The winner determination would remain the same as 
in the previously described algorithms; however, the payment of the winners would now be 
the maximum between the previously calculated payment and the required payment to satisfy 
the reservation price per impression. 
4.3. LIST PRICE ALTERNATIVE 
To allow for a revenue comparison between the smart market auctions and a list price 
system, the following list price model was developed.  In this model, advertisers must only 
decide whether or not they want to purchase impressions at the list price and must not place 
any bids.  If their value Va is greater than the list price La, they will buy and else they will 
not.  Since different demographic groups can have differing list prices, some advertisers will 
need to pay more than others. 
Once the purchasing decision has been made by the advertisers, the seller must decide 
how to fill the flotilla.  Again, they could use an optimization model that maximizes their 
revenue.  The required formulation is very similar to the previous optimization model with 
two main differences: the objective function uses the list prices (not the individual values) 
and an additional constraint is needed to ensure that only advertisers with values greater than 
the list price can participate in the auction. 
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Linear Integer Programming Optimization Model – List Price 
Model parameters 
H, A, S, Va, Ta,h are defined as before. 
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4.4. COMPUTATIONAL ANALYSIS 
4.4.1. Introduction and Parameters 
This section analyzes the new auction models to determine which one will result in the 
highest revenue and what impact the market structure (in terms of number of advertisers, 
their value distribution, etc.) will have on the suitability of the models.  Furthermore, the 
expected revenue of the auction models is compared to that of a list price system.  The results 
are obtained using Monte Carlo simulation.  For an excellent summary of this method, see 
Rubinstein and Kroese (2008). 
To allow for a computational analysis and Monte Carlo simulation, this work is 
completed under the following framework:  it is assumed that the flotilla consists of two 
slots.  Further, it is assumed that the population of television viewers consists of four distinct 
demographic groups, females and males either under or over the age of 30.  Table 4.6 shows 
the percentage of the total population that each of these demographic groups encompasses. 
Abbreviation Demographic Group Percent of Total 
Population 
1F Females under the age of 30 20% 
2F Females over the age of 30 20% 
1M Males under the age of 30 30% 
2M Males over the age of 30 30% 
Table 4.6: Sample data for demographic composition of viewers. 
Advertisers can target any combination of these demographics which leads to nine possible 
target groups which are listed in Table 4.7.  The table also shows the percent of advertisers 
that fall into those respective groups and the average value per impression that these 
demographic groups are worth to advertisers.  These values have been chosen arbitrarily and 
do not reflect real market prices; however, as would be expected in the market place, target 






Abbreviation Target Demographic Group Percent of 
Advertisers 
Average Value of Demo-
graphic Group (GD) 
1F Females under the age of 30 20% 1.4
2F Females over the age of 30 5% 0.6
1M Males under the age of 30 15% 1.2
2M Males over the age of 30 5% 0.8
F All Females 10% 1.0
M All Males 10% 1.0
1 All people under the age of 30  20% 1.3
2 All people over the age of 30 10% 0.7
FM All people 5% 1.0
Table 4.7: Sample data for advertiser composition in terms of target demographics. 
The random inputs to the Monte Carlo simulation are as follows: 
1. Each viewer is randomly chosen to be one of the four demographic types in 
accordance with the probabilities given in Table 4.6 
2. Each advertiser is randomly chosen to be targeting one of the nine demographic 
groups in accordance with the probabilities listed in Table 4.7 
3. Each advertiser receives a value (per impression of his target group) based on an 
exponential distribution with an average value in accordance with GD (see Table 
4.7) 
4.4.2. Base Case Scenario 
In the base case scenario, there are 10 viewers and 5 advertisers.  Figure 4.1 shows the 
expected revenue for each of the previously described auction models and the list price 
system.  These results are based on 200 runs, and the 90% confidence interval is indicated by 
black bars.  For this base case scenario, the list price for each demographic target group was 
set at 20% above the average value.  For example, advertisers targeting females under the age 
of 30 were charged 1.68 (=1.4+20%*1.4, using Table 4.7).  The perfect (price) 
discrimination bar in Figure 4.1 shows how much revenue could be extracted if it was 
possible to charge the precise value of each advertiser.  Of course, this is not possible 
because the seller does not know the precise values of individual advertisers.  If the seller 
were to charge the advertisers their full bids, then this would represent a first price auction 
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system which would result in bid shading by the advertisers.  Even though the perfect 
discrimination revenue is not attainable, it shows the maximum amount of value that is 
available. 









Figure 4.1: Expected revenue of auctions and list price in base case. 
As Figure 4.1 shows, none of the described auction models can capture even half of the 
available value (the perfect price discrimination case).  However, this is a reflection of the 
low ratio of numbers of advertisers to available flotilla slots, as will become apparent later.  
Furthermore, the domination of algorithm 2nd Largest Ad is misleading because these results 
were based on truth-telling bidding behaviour.  As previously mentioned, this is not an 
accurate assumption for the algorithm 2nd Largest Ad.  For this reason, this algorithm will no 
longer be included in the analysis.  This does not necessarily imply that this algorithm is not 
a viable auction model; however, the expected revenue from this auction must be calculated 
under the assumption of bid shading.  This may be an interesting area for future research. 
However, truth-telling is valid assumption for the VCG mechanism and algorithm 
Reimburse, and Figure 4.1 shows that algorithm Reimburse is not far behind the VCG 
mechanism in its ability to raise revenue (expected revenue is 15% and 10% below VCG for 
algorithm Reimburse and Reimburse Revised, respectively).  In addition, the algorithm 
Reimburse can execute in a fraction of time of the VCG mechanism.  A later section will 
investigate the implications of the execution time. 
In this base case, the list price leads to more revenue than the auction models.  
However, using the results of Chapter 3, we expect that the list price only dominates the 
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auction systems when the ratio of number of advertisers to available flotilla slots is very low.  
The next section will explore the breakeven point at which auction models result in higher 
expected revenue than the list price system. 
4.4.3. Number of Advertisers 
Figure 4.2 shows how the list price mechanism initially dominates the auction models but 
raises less revenue than the auction models as the number of advertisers increases.  Since the 
revised version of algorithm Reimburse always outperforms the former, only the revised 



















VCG Reimburse Revised List Price  
Figure 4.2: Expected revenue of auctions and list price by number of advertisers. 
Figure 4.2 provides two main insights: first, the algorithm Reimburse Revised raises a similar 
amount of revenue as the VCG mechanism when only a small number of advertisers are in 
the system.  However, the higher the number of bidders, the wider the gap between the 
expected revenue from the VCG mechanism and the algorithm Reimburse Revised.  Second, 
the list price only raises more revenue than the VCG mechanism if the number of advertisers 
is less than seven.  In addition, using the list price system implies the additional challenge of 
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finding the optimal list price.  Therefore, the next section will investigate how sensitive the 
expected revenue is to changes in the list price. 
4.4.4. Setting the Correct List Price 
This section analyzes the case of 10 viewers with 4 advertisers.  Figure 4.3 compares 
expected revenue of the list price system to the VCG auction as the list price increases.  Since 
the number of advertisers is low, the list price is expected to dominate the auction.  More 
specifically, Figure 4.3 shows that the list price will dominate as long as it is set between 0.7 
and 1.9 of the average value of the respective demographic group (roughly 40% below or 





























List Price VCG  
Figure 4.3: Expected revenue of list price dependent on list price set. 
As before, the seller should rather overestimate the list price than underestimate it if they are 
uncertain of the optimal value.  In the case of four advertisers there is a relatively broad range 
of list prices that will still lead to higher revenues than the VCG mechanism.  Chapter 3 
illustrated how the benefits of the auction model and the list price system can be combined 
by using an auction with a reservation price.  The following section investigates how such a 
model would perform in the targeted television advertising system. 
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4.4.5. Setting a Reservation Price 
Using the base case scenario, Figure 4.4 shows the substantial gains in expected revenue that 
can be made by using a reservation price with the auction models. 
- 2.00 4.00 6.00 8.00 10.00 12.00 14.00
Perfect Discrimination
VCG with reservation price







Figure 4.4: Expected revenue of auctions with reservation price and list price in base case. 
Figure 4.4 shows that the seller can expect the highest revenue by using an auction model 
with a reservation price.  For example, the expected revenue increases by 28% (from 4.3 to 
5.5) when a reservation price is added to the VCG mechanism.  Even with only a small 
number of advertisers, the auction models with reservation price will outperform the list price 
system.  However, as with the list price, the performance of the auction model with a 
reservation price depends on how the reservation price is set.  A reservation price that is set 
too low will fail to make an impact while a reservation price that is set too high will cause 
too many advertisers to stay away from the auction.  Assuming 10 viewers and 4 advertisers, 
Figure 4.5 demonstrates this trade-off and shows how the reservation price should be set at 
























































VCG with reservation price VCG  
Figure 4.5: Expected revenue of VCG auction with reservation price. 
The range of reservation prices that lead to higher expected revenues is even broader than for 
the list price.  A reservation price that is set very low will not have a worse effect than its 
complete omission but it will fail to increase revenue.  This effect can be seen in Figure 4.5 
where the VCG with reservation price leads to higher expected revenue as soon as the 
reservation price exceeds zero.  And the two methods lead to identical expected revenues 
when the reservation price is exactly zero.  Furthermore, the reservation price can exceed 
double its optimal value and still lead to higher expected revenues than the equivalent auction 
model without the reservation price. 
4.4.6. Value Distribution Functions 
All the previous figures were based on [λ]-exponential value distributions of the advertisers.  
This section explores how the auction models perform based on a [a, b]-uniform distribution 
and a [µ, σ]-normal distribution, where a=GD*0.5, b=GD*1.5, µ=GD, σ=GD*0.2 depending on 
the demographic group (see Table 4.7).  Figure 4.6 compares the three different value 
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Perfect Discrimination VCG Reimburse Revised  
Figure 4.6: Expected revenue of auctions depending on value distributions. 
Again, the results are consistent with the findings of Chapter 3.  With a small number of 
bidders, the auction models perform well if the variance of the value distributions is low and 
vice versa.   
4.5. LIMITATIONS 
4.5.1. Large-scale Optimization 
One of the downsides of the VCG mechanism is the required computational time to execute 
the optimization.  In a scenario with 15 advertisers and 10 viewers and 3 flotilla slots, the 
Excel Solver requires 8.6 seconds (average, based on 100 runs) to find the optimal solution 
using the optimization model described in Section 4.2.5.  To complete the VCG method, the 
optimization must run once with all advertisers included and then once again for each of the 
winning advertisers.  Therefore, the system must optimize multiple times to determine the 
outcome of the VCG auction which increases the total run time even further (in this case to 
8.5*3=25.5 seconds).  As a comparison, the average execution time of the algorithm 
Reimburse is 0.0003 seconds assuming the same number of advertisers, viewers and flotilla 
slots. 
The execution time can be drastically shortened by using a more powerful solver.  The 
website NEOS (http://www-neos.mcs.anl.gov/) offers state-of-the-art optimization software 
which can execute much faster than the standard Excel Solver.  One of their featured solvers, 
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MINTO, solves mixed-integer linear programs through a branch-and-bound algorithm with 
linear programming relaxations.  In the above case with 15 advertisers and 10 viewers and 3 
flotilla slots, MINTO decreases the average execution time of a single optimization by 90% 
(from 8.5 to 1 seconds). 
However, the seller may face optimization problems of a size that challenges even very 
powerful solvers such as MINTO.  For example, increasing the problem to 30 viewers and 30 
advertisers (still 3 flotilla slots) extends the average execution time of a single optimization 
to roughly 100 seconds using MINTO.  For even larger problems, the required optimization 
time may not be feasible as the seller only has limited time available to construct the flotilla. 
4.5.2. Main Assumptions 
Aside from the parameters of the simulation model (such as the value distributions and 
number of advertisers) and the framework of a private value auction, there are a few other 
assumptions that drive the previous results. 
First, the expected revenue is derived from these auction models assume that 
advertisers bid truthfully.  An example given earlier showed that this is definitely not valid 
for the algorithm 2nd Largest Ad and that advertisers can gain from shading their bid.  In 
comparison, in both the VCG mechanism and the algorithm Reimburse, the advertisers’ bids 
only influence the probability of winning and not the amount to be paid, which makes them 
both truth-telling mechanisms.  However, as mentioned earlier, there are other considerations 
that may influence how advertisers bid such as privacy concerns (revealing their true value) 
or a perceived lack of fairness.  Both can lead to bid shading. 
Second, the results assume that there is no collusion between advertisers.  Given the 
limited information of advertisers regarding the other bids that are in the system at any given 
time, this is likely a valid assumption.  The motivating example of Section 4.1.1 showed that 
there are cases in which advertisers can successfully use shill bids in a VCG auction; 
however, they would need to know the full information matrix (current households and 
advertisers in the marketplace).  Although they could try to guess, this information is not 
accessible to them and a shill bid could easily backfire on the advertiser and lead to higher 
costs.  Furthermore, within the context of a smart market in which there is no direct bidding, 
it is nearly impossible to collude successfully.  Too many factors are outside of the 
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advertisers’ control such as when the individual avails occur and which households will be 
watching at those particular moments. 
4.6. CONCLUSIONS 
The analysis showed that many of the findings of Chapter 3 still hold in this full model.  
However, some of the standard auctions are not directly applicable to this problem.  Instead, 
new auction models must be developed to deal with the complexity of the targeted television 
advertising system.   
4.6.1. Algorithm Reimburse vs. VCG Mechanism 
An optimization model was developed that allows for a VCG implementation but the 
required optimization may require excessive execution time.  The auction models Reimburse 
and Reimburse Revised were developed that also lead to truth-telling bidding behaviour 
without requiring a time-consuming optimization.   
The revised version of the algorithm Reimburse always outperforms the former version.  
In addition, the revised version performs well against the VCG mechanism (in terms of 
revenue) if the number of advertisers in the system is small.  However, the more advertisers 
are in the system, the larger the gap between the expected revenue of the VCG mechanism 
and the algorithm Reimburse Revised. 
The type of value distribution has a lesser impact on the relative performance of the 
algorithm Reimburse Revised compared to the VCG mechanism.  Nevertheless, a lower 
variance in the bidders’ value distribution leads to an increasing performance margin 
between the two algorithms in terms of their expected revenue.  Consequently, the choice of 
auction model depends on the preferences of the seller and the market structure he faces. 
4.6.2. List Price System vs. VCG Mechanism 
As is the model of Chapter 3, a list price system only leads to higher revenue if the ratio of 
advertisers to flotilla slots is low.  This result is not price sensitive and even if the list price 
deviates significantly from the optimal price.  However, the VCG mechanism outperforms 




With the introduction of reservation prices the auction models become superior to the 
list price system regardless of the parameters.  Similar to the list price, the range of 
reservation prices that lead to higher expected revenue is broad.  Consequently, slight over- 
or underestimations will not lead to negative results. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
5.1. CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis has analyzed how a seller with new technology to deliver targeted television 
advertising can successfully sell its avails through auctions and has explored when it is 
beneficial to do so.  There are many aspects to the way that the seller offers television 
advertising impressions that are new and original; in particular, the information structure 
under which the seller must decide which advertisers receive slots in the flotilla and how 
much they should be charged has not been previously studied.  This thesis suggests specific 
auction rules that will lead to desirable results such as revenue maximization and limitation 
of computational complexity.  Furthermore, this thesis provides the seller with guidance on 
the decision between a list price system and an auction model.   
5.1.1. List Price versus Auction Model 
If there are relatively few advertisers in the marketplace, the list price system will generally 
outperform an auction.  However, auction models with reservation prices will lead to higher 
expected revenues compared to a list price system regardless of the number of advertisers.  
The expected revenue is relatively insensitive to the precise value of the list price but under 
uncertainty the seller is better off overestimating the price. 
The seller may choose to implement a list price system in some local markets in which 
they expect a smaller number of advertisers.  They may also use some of these local markets 
to experiment with how they should set the list price.   
5.1.2. Type of Auction Model 
First price auction models create undesirable instability in the system as bidders will try to 
game the system and will keep updating their bids.  Some auctions, such as the algorithm 2nd 
Largest Ad, may seem like a truth revealing auction but will actually lead to bid shading and 
attempts to game the system.  However, the seller now has a method of applying the VCG 
mechanism to their system.  This mechanism truly promotes truth-telling in the bidding 
behaviour but it may require long execution times.  As an alternative, the seller can use the 
algorithm Reimburse which also promotes truth-telling but executes much faster. 
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5.2. FUTURE RESEARCH 
The new targeted television advertising system provides many avenues for future research.  
Companies such as Google, who have also implemented smart market auctions, have spent 
many years of manpower to develop the successful system that they now operate.  For 
example, in Google’s system advertisers can choose to bid a maximum amount that they are 
willing to pay (which was also assumed in this thesis) or an average amount.  The latter 
forces Google to ensure that the advertiser pays this average price by inserting his 
advertisements into appropriate auctions.  Risk-averse advertisers may be very interested in 
such an option in the new targeted television advertising system. 
In addition, there will have to be some feedback to the bidders after the completion of 
the auctions.  Because there will be many auctions in a day, as well as future advertising 
campaigns by the same advertisers, information provided to the bidders may influence future 
bidding behaviour.  A crucial question to address is therefore when to provide information to 
the bidders and which information to provide.  The depth of information provided to the 
bidder could range from only one number (the number of viewers reached) or a more detailed 
report indicating statistics such as average price paid for each viewer or the average 
completion of campaign targets by other bidders.   
Furthermore, it seems intuitive to allow bidders to increase their bids throughout their 
campaign because it should lead to revenue increases for the seller.  The question remains 
whether the bidders should be allowed to increase and decrease their bids and how frequent 
they should be allowed to update their bids.  This question should be researched in 
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Calculation use integration by parts (Stewart, 1999). 
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